#### **NON-PAPER**

- 1. Peacekeeping is an essential tool in the hands of the United Nations. Looking back on the last sixty years, it has had a remarkable record in preventing war and suffering, and facilitating long-term political solutions in often intractable situations.
- 2. UN Peackeeping has also had, and is still facing, serious difficulties. Some are inherent to peacekeeping itself. Others are related to the specific division of responsabilities that characterizes the Organization, and the practices that have developed over time. Others are related to the current rapid growth in the number of operations, a critical factorat a time when resources are scarce. A final set is related to the increasing complexity of operations, and the general awareness that no sustainable peace can take hold without a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians, justice, human rights, and peacebuilding.
- 3. The challenges are immense. In our view, several should be addressed as a matter of priority:
- <u>-Effective strategic oversight</u>: The first area to address, as a pre-requisite and a common denominator to all peacekeeping issues, is the quality of preparation, planning, oversight and evaluation of operations. Considerable progress can be made by improving the information flow between Security Council, the Secretariat, and TCCs; improving the Council's military expertise, risk analysis, and transparency across the chain of command; improving resolution drafting, including on benchmarks and exit strategies;
- -Resource constraints: there is an obvious overstretch, with huge costs, strains on efficiency on the ground and at headquarters, which makes it more difficult to react to new crises. It can be addressed in six basic ways: (1) considering alternatives to peacekeeping and rigorously assessing new commitments (2) substituting civilian activities for military activities where appropriate (3) "outsourcing" activities to third parties and sharing the burden with other organizations (4) closing existing operations (5) downsizing existing operations (6) increasing our cost-efficiency, including on the logistics and sourcing side. Serious efforts should be undertaken to address all six.
- <u>- Lessons from implementation</u>: there are gaps between mandates contained in UNSC resolutions and their implementation on the ground, which vary according to the provisions concerned, and to Force Commanders/SRSGs and troop contributors in charge. Work should be undertaken to assess which mandate provisions are under-implemented and why. The aim should be to draw lessons for resolution drafters, for the composition of the mission and for dialogue with TCCs. This assessment should also cover issues related to the implementation of complex mandates (balance and integration of civilian and military activities; implementation of provisions on human rights, protection of civilians, and judicial issues).
- 4. While the Security Council has a special responsibility for Peacekeeping under the Charter, Peacekeeping is an equity of the whole membership and the whole UN system. Our discussions should be conducted in closest coordination with the Secretary General and the DPKO. Dialogue should also be intensified with the bodies and institutions that have complementary mandates in this area, including the UNGA's Fifth Committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), the Peace-Building Commission, relevant UN agencies and programmes, and the Council Working Group on Peacekeeping chaired by Japan.

- 5. France and the UK intend to launch a collaborative process, with the aim of achieving a first set of concrete results by August 2009. .
- **6.** As a first step, we propose to address the issue of effective strategic oversight. A first series of proposals is articulated below, for the Members' consideration.

## Effective Strategic Oversight

# Improving the preparation, planning, monitoring and evaluation of UN Peacekeeping operations

In the light of the manifold increase in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), the complexity and robustness of their mandates and the insecurity of the environments in which they take place, in-depth reflection is required, with a view to improving their preparation, planning, monitoring and evaluation.

In January 2007, the Council stressed in a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/1) the "importance of a more strategic approach to the oversight and direction of peacekeeping, to maximise the prospects for successful transition in the countries concerned [and] to make possible the most effective use of scarce peacekeeping resources". Such an approach is all the more relevant now, as evidenced in the recent Security Council debates on MONUC and the Kivu crisis.

In the United Nations'system, the management of PKOs is decentralised. Security Council resolutions create PKOs and their mandates. The planning process and the monitoring are entrusted to the UN Secretariat. The operation itself is directed in the field by the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Force Commander, using the resources provided by Troop Contributing Countries. The capacity of the UN Strategic Military HQ in New York to provide direction and oversight to missions is limited.

Four issues, inter alia, deserve specific attention:

- how to reinforce the Council and the Secretariat's work on preparation, planning and monitoring at the strategic level in New York;
- how to ensure that each SC MS receives coherent and accurate military analysis;
- how to reinforce the dialogue between the Council and the UN Secretariat on the military dimension of PKOs;
- how to improve mission effectiveness and how to embed best practice.

In this regard, the following actions could be considered:

## A/ Preparation and planning of operations

• Facilitate Security Council decision-making on the strategic effect required to maintain peace and security, how to respond appropriately to the threat to peace and security if there is one, including deciding whether a PKO is appropriate, what its key tasks should be and how these should be reflected in the mandate, building on a sound strategic and military assessment.

To that end:

- The Security Council should develop the currently emerging practice of joint briefings by the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with political-military experts of the Security Council;
- Examine the means to provide Security Council members with adequate military advice.
- The Secretariat may wish to consider providing more systematic reporting to the Security Council on strategic-level documents (i.e. CONOPS)
- The Secretariat could provide the Security Council with early sight of the financial implications of its decisions
- The Security Council should develop best practice for authorising new missions, including a set of principles based on Brahimi, and drafting guidelines for resolutions.
- The Secretariat may wish to consider improving the strategic-level planning process and interaction with the field (SRSG or Force Commander): adequate update of strategic-level documents (CONOPS) to match the evolution of military requirements; ownership and validation of main documents elaborated in the field (ie OPLAN).
- Coordinated action to implement a more effective processof preparation and management of troop contributions to ensure adequately trained and equipped troops are deployed, by strengthening dialogue with TCCs, including on the issue of caveats. Improved sharing of peacekeeping military doctrine and best practice could contribute to this.

Throughout the planning and preparation stage, two overriding principles should apply:

- Mandates should have clear strategic political objectives and should identify key benchmarks which the Secretary General can report against and which the Council can base its evaluations on.
- All relevant parts of the UN system should be brought into the process as early as possible, to ensure a joined-up approach and to maximise the prospects for success on the ground.

#### B/ Monitoring and conduct of operations

- The Security Council and Secretariat should ensure theyimprove their exchange of information on the conduct of operations, in particular more complex operations, through regular and ad hoc meetings, at the level of political-military experts of the Council. The Council and Secretariat could also agree guidelines on the information that should be included in SG reports. Increased involvement of TCCs would also be desirable. This will enable the Security Council to update or reduce tasks and adjust the level of resources to meet these tasks. It will also aid the Council in monitoring success.
- The Secretariat may wish to strengthen monitoring capabilities in New York, including the ability to generate without delay appropriate information on the military situation and the actions carried out by the PKO, with a view to:

- having an assessment of the situation;
- being in a position to inform the Council and capitals.

To that end, it would be important to increase the military information flow between the Secretariat and the field.

### C/ Evaluation of operations

- The Council and Secretariat should improve dialogue on the evaluation of operations, including convening systematically, before mandate renewals, meetings of political-military experts of the Council with the Secretariat.
- The Council and the Secretariat should consider strengthening the evaluation process through:
- a better integration into the evaluation process of the objectives laid down in the planning documents;
- involvement of the Council's Military and PK experts in the evaluation process
- better taking into account the result of evaluations in deciding on mandate renewal and adaptation;
- better dialogue with TCCs to draw conclusions on the action of each contingent deployed within an operation./.