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Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the fifty-eighth report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 80/80.

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Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

Summary

The present report contains information regarding Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the occupied Syrian Golan and other areas in the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon occupied by Israeli forces from August 2025 to June 2026.

I. Introduction

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories was established in 1968 by the General Assembly in its resolution 2443 (XXIII). It is composed of three Member States: Malaysia, Senegal and Sri Lanka, represented by their Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, with the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka serving as Chair. The Special Committee reports to the Secretary-General. Its reports are reviewed in the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the General Assembly.

II. Mandate and activities

2. The Special Committee is mandated to investigate Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people and other Arabs of the territories considered to be remaining under Israeli occupation since 1967. The Special Committee is not mandated to investigate human rights violations committed by other duty bearers in those territories. The present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 80/80 (2025), covers the period from 1 August 2025 to 30 June 2026.

3. Since its establishment in 1968, the Special Committee has not been granted access by Israel to the occupied territories, but it continues to seek cooperation. In June 2026, the Committee again requested the cooperation of Israel with its mandate and a meeting with Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva. The Government of Israel did not respond to that request.

4. In the absence of access, the Committee held its annual consultations in Geneva from 17 to 19 June 2026. It met with representatives of Member States, United Nations entities and United Nations human rights mechanisms, including the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, as well as special procedures mandate holders, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders.

5. Due to budget constraints and the ongoing regional conflict, the Special Committee was unable to conduct its annual visit to the Middle East region.

III. International initiatives concerning Gaza

A. New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution

6. Endorsed by a large majority of Member States in the General Assembly on 12 September 2025 (see decision 80/506),[1] the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution[2] and its addendum,[3] adopted on 6 August 2025, set out a road map for a two-State solution that includes four distinct elements. In the first element, Member States

[1] General Assembly decision 80/506 was adopted with 142 votes in favour, 10 against and 12 abstentions. The number of States that voted in favour of the decision demonstrates the consensus behind the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution.

[2] See A/CONF.243/2025/1.

[3] See A/CONF.243/2025/1/Add.1.

demanded an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, the exchange of Palestinian prisoners and humanitarian access, and that relevant international legal obligations be respected. In the second, they called for the disarmament of Hamas and its exclusion from governance in Gaza and the reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority. In the third, Member States addressed reconstruction and institutional recovery, including international support to Palestinian institutions, reconstruction and financial support for essential United Nations operations, especially the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In the fourth, they called for the deployment of a temporary international stabilization mission under the aegis of the United Nations, to be deployed at the invitation of the Palestinian Authority and mandated by the Security Council.

7. The Declaration constituted a major political and normative achievement, as it reconnected the end of the hostilities in Gaza with the two-State solution and the latter with the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, all within the framework of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The political legitimacy of the Declaration's pathway to Palestinian statehood, which was built on the inclusive process of the deliberations at the High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,[4] helped create diplomatic momentum that led to a wave of new recognitions of the State of Palestine. The Declaration also linked the two-State framework to third States' obligations not to recognize, aid or assist the unlawful situation arising from the presence of Israel and its practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

8. While international follow-up mechanisms and measures were to be decided upon by the Co-Chairs of the Conference on the basis of a range of proposals and recommendations received from the States that participated in the Conference, the initiative led by the United States of America led to a separate operational track for Gaza.

B. Security Council resolution 2803 (2025) and the Board of Peace

9. At a press conference on 29 September,[5] the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, accompanied by the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, announced a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel entitled "President Donald J. Trump's Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict".[6] The ceasefire agreement was signed on 9 October and was to come into effect on the following day.

10. The Comprehensive Plan provides for the creation of an international transitional administration for the governance of Gaza,[7] the Board of Peace, until "the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform … and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza". The Board of Peace, made up of several interlinked bodies, created a multilayered governance architecture for Gaza. Responsibility for

[4] The High-Level Conference was co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, and the Co-Chairs of the Working Groups were Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, Senegal, Spain, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Union and the League of Arab States.

[5] See https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/president-trump-participates-in-a-press-conference-with-the-prime-minister-of-the-state-of-israel/.

[6] Security Council resolution 2803 (2025), annex 1.

[7] Ibid., para. 9.

the "security" of Gaza was to be handed over to an international stabilization force.[8] The Plan also provides for Israel to maintain its presence in Gaza pending the deployment of the international stabilization force. That presence will ultimately include "a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat".

11. The Comprehensive Plan, which was endorsed by the Security Council on 17 November 2025 (resolution 2803 (2025), annex), contains critical elements, including a ceasefire, the release of hostages and other arbitrarily detained persons, an increase in humanitarian aid, the rejection of forced displacement from Gaza and the annexation of the Gaza Strip by Israel and the progressive withdrawal of Israeli forces. In resolution 2803 (2025), the Security Council decided that the authorization granted to the Board of Peace and the related international civil and security presences will remain in effect until 31 December 2027.

12. In the Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity,[9] which was signed on 13 October 2025 by the four guarantor countries of the Comprehensive Plan, the signatories stressed that lasting peace requires both Palestinians and Israelis to have "their fundamental human rights protected, their security guaranteed and their dignity upheld", and they committed themselves to promoting "equal opportunity for every person, … regardless of race, faith or ethnicity".

13. Transitional governance or security arrangements in Gaza must be guided by the interests and rights of the Palestinian people, thereby ensuring their meaningful participation in political, economic and reconstruction processes and enabling them to freely determine their future. Such structures must incorporate robust mechanisms for transparency, accountability and redress for violations. Early recovery and reconstruction efforts must be human rights-based, with a view to ensuring the safe and dignified return of displaced Palestinians, prioritizing protection needs and supporting the preservation of evidence for accountability processes. Ultimately, justice for all victims, including accountability for serious violations of international law, is indispensable to achieving a sustainable peace that is founded on respect for rights.

IV. Situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

14. In its 2024 report, the Special Committee concluded that the conduct of Israel with respect to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip was consistent with the characteristics of genocide.[10] Developments reflected in the present report confirm that assessment, as well as widening ethnic cleansing across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including faith-based attacks, and the widespread destruction of religious sites, which effectively advances the end goal of the "greater Israel" project.[11]

A. Ongoing genocide of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip

15. Despite the ceasefire agreement, which entered into force on 10 October 2025, Israel continued to use military force and expanded its control over the Gaza Strip. Only a few days after the announced entry into force of the ceasefire, air strikes and artillery shelling were reported across the Gaza Strip. On 17 October, 11 Palestinians (7 children, 2 women and 2 men) were killed when a bus carrying internally displaced

[8] Ibid., para. 15.
[9] See https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/10/the-trump-declaration-for-enduring-peace-and-prosperity/.
[10] See A/79/363.
[11] A/80/365, sect. V.

persons was hit. Two days later, four Palestinian children were killed and several others were injured when an UNRWA school in the Nuseirat refugee camp that was being used as a shelter was shelled by Israeli forces.[12]

16. The Comprehensive Plan established an initial line of withdrawal that demarcates roughly 53 per cent of the territory of Gaza, where Israeli troops would remain deployed pending the release of all hostages. The area east of the so-called yellow line became a no-go zone for Palestinians, who were ordered to move to the west side of the line. Those coming close to it risk being shot at by the Israeli forces. According to investigations conducted by the media, in this depopulated zone, Israel progressively tore down any remaining structures, setting fire to fields and bulldozing towns and once green agricultural communities into the ground.[13] In December 2025, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted that the Israeli military was deployed beyond the yellow line, in areas where humanitarian access to facilities, infrastructure and farmland was "restricted or prohibited".[14] In May 2026, maps released by Israeli authorities showed an "orange line" demarcating an additional 11 per cent of the territory of Gaza beyond the yellow line, together cordoning off roughly two thirds of the Strip.[15] In video recordings made at a conference in May 2026, Mr. Netanyahu said that he had directed the Israeli army to expand its control of Gaza and seize 70 per cent of the territory, adding that Israel would continue to increase its control "step by step" and "deal with the remnants" of Hamas.[16] The Minister of Finance of Israel, Bezalel Smotrich, publicly announced his readiness to establish three settlements in northern Gaza and said that Israel should seize the entire territory of Gaza and start the colonization process.[17]

17. As at 18 June 2026, 1,007 Palestinians,[18] including 265 children,[19] had been killed in Gaza since October 2025 as a result of almost daily air and artillery strikes on densely populated areas, homes, shelters and refugee camps across all five governorates of Gaza, or had been shot dead while walking in residential areas or simply for being in proximity to the yellow line. As at early April 2026, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had verified 629 of the 1,007 fatalities. Of the verified fatalities, 196 persons, including 18 women and 43 children, had been killed near the yellow line.[20] Many were reportedly killed while moving through areas lacking clear demarcation on the ground.

18. As at 24 June 2026, a total of 73,041 Palestinians had been killed since October 2023 according to the Health Ministry in Gaza; of the victims who have been fully identified, some 30 per cent are children. Thousands remain missing, trapped under rubble or buried in locations that cannot be safely reached.[21] In September 2025, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities reported that more than 40,500

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[12] See https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-334-gaza-strip.

[13] See https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2026/07/01/israels-campaign-erasure-demolition-eastern-gaza.

[14] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-351-gaza-strip.

[15] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-26-june-2026.

[16] See for instance https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-says-he-ordered-idf-to-seize-70-of-gaza-strip-well-beyond-terms-of-ceasefire-deal/; https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/28/middleeast/israel-netanyahu-military-70-percent-gaza-intl; and https://youtu.be/f2qM8VWdYxo?si=WQV9L2N-_UZJ9c4i.

[17] See https://x.com/bezalelsm/status/2071664988301766803. See also https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/6/29/israels-smotrich-calls-for-settlements-conquest-of-gaza-strip#flips-6399750565112:0.

[18] See https://x.com/OHCHR_Palestine/status/2067632390680256553?s=20.

[19] See https://www.instagram.com/reel/DZxd7fuDb9A.

[20] See https://x.com/OHCHR_Palestine/status/2067632390680256553?s=20.

[21] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-24-june-2026.

children had suffered "new war-related injuries" since October 2023.[22] In May 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that roughly one in four of all those injured in Gaza since 7 October had sustained life-changing injuries, of whom approximately 10,000 were children.[23] A long-term multigenerational disability crisis has been unfolding in Gaza, with tens of thousands of Palestinians now living with life-changing injuries, including amputations, limb loss, severe burns, spinal injuries and traumatic brain injuries.[24]

19. Israel, authorized to control more than half of Gaza and expand that control without bearing any consequences, has continued to fragment the Gaza Strip into ad hoc zones that are poorly marked and can shift in an unpredictable manner, thereby disrupting communities and families[25] and making any movement through Gaza hazardous or impossible.[26] In April 2026, OHCHR warned that Palestinians in Gaza were being denied any safety and protection, regardless of their activity or whereabouts.[27] As at the end June 2026, most of the 2.1 million people of Gaza remained displaced, crammed into a third of the territory and facing what the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) described as "suffocating density" and a daily struggle to meet basic, vital needs.[28]

20. The health system has been decimated. Thousands of patients, including children, remained trapped inside the Strip, resulting in more preventable deaths.[29] WHO continued to report severe shortages of essential medicines, medical consumables, fuel, spare parts and equipment, affecting intensive care, dialysis, operating theatres, laboratories, emergency care, surgery, rehabilitation, maternal care, chronic disease treatment and specialist services.[30]

21. Damaged water and sewerage infrastructure, fuel-dependent water production, unsafe waste accumulation, overcrowding, subhuman shelter conditions and limited hygiene supplies continued to pose major environmental and public health risks. The collapse of water, sanitation, hygiene and solid waste systems, the destruction of piped water systems and improvised sanitation increased contamination of the coastal aquifer of Gaza and likely led to marine and coastal contamination.[31] In addition, it has caused serious rodent and insect infestations and the spread of related infectious diseases, as well as other preventable health problems.[32] The Special Committee

[22] CRPD/C/33/2, annex IV, para. 38.
[23] See https://www.emro.who.int/opt/news/one-in-four-injuries-in-gaza-is-life-changing-while-rehabilitation-services-struggle-to-keep-pace-who-reports.html.
[24] See www.humanity-inclusion.org.uk/en/more-than-6-thousand-prosthetic-limbs-needed-in-gaza; and https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/hq-whe/estimating-trauma-rehabilitation-needs-in-gaza-september-2025.pdf, pp. 21 and 22.
[25] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-351-gaza-strip.
[26] See https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/israeli-maps-outline-expanded-zone-military-control-gaza.
[27] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/palestinians-across-gaza-unsafe-six-months-ceasefire-announcement-says-turk.
[28] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-26-june-2026; and https://x.com/ICRC/status/2071935796156788812?s=20.
[29] See https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166890. See also https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cze61zg7zzpo; and https://www.savethechildren.ca/article/children-in-gaza-cut-off-from-life-saving-care-just-one-hour-away-experts-available-ahead-of-may-7-court-hearing/.
[30] See https://apps.who.int/gb/scheppr/pdf_files/SCHEPPR8/EB_SCHEPPR8_4-en.pdf; and https://www.emro.who.int/opt/news/one-in-four-injuries-in-gaza-is-life-changing-while-rehabilitation-services-struggle-to-keep-pace-who-reports.html.
[31] See https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/environmental-damage-gaza-strip-harming-human-health-threatening.
[32] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-23-april-2026; https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-7-may-2026; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/27/israeli-attacks-gaza-clean-water-shortage-crisis-disease-palestine; and https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rats-infest-gazas-tent-camps-biting-children-spreading-disease-2026-04-30/.

heard first-hand testimony of how people in Gaza survive in appalling living conditions, forced to stand guard overnight in order to prevent rats from attacking their malnourished children. The risk of vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks also remained serious.[33] Malnutrition continued to compound those risks, especially for children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, older people and persons with disabilities, by weakening immunity, increasing vulnerability to infection and delaying recovery.[34]

22. Rubble and debris remained a long-term hazard. As at September 2025, a total of 61 million tons of debris, some 15 per cent of which is at relatively high risk of being contaminated with asbestos, industrial waste or heavy metals,[35] as well as other contaminants, such as explosives or medical waste, was creating significant health and environmental hazards.[36]

23. While the availability of food and humanitarian assistance improved following the declaration of the ceasefire in October and famine was averted, 1.6 million Palestinians in Gaza, or more than three quarters of the population, continued to face extreme levels of acute food insecurity and critical malnutrition risks in December 2025 according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.[37] As at April 2026, more than 86 per cent of agricultural water wells, 79 per cent of greenhouses and 87 per cent of cropland were damaged, with only 4 per cent of cropland still undamaged and accessible.[38] FAO described the fishing sector of Gaza as being near collapse, and it noted that recovery would depend on safe access to fishing waters and the entry of essential fishing inputs and tools.[39] During the first half of May, 37,792 children aged 6 to 59 months were screened for acute malnutrition, and most households were still unable to meet daily minimum needs of water for drinking and cooking.[40]

B. Deterioration of the human rights situation in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem

24. The security situation in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, deteriorated to an unprecedent critical level during the reporting period. The administrative and military apparatus of the Israeli State continued to entrench its occupation of Palestinian land and its control over resources, movement and everyday life. In practice, this was implemented through a combination of legislative changes, expanded military operations and the systematic enabling of settler violence,[41] revealing a clear institutional goal of undermining the viability of Palestinian

[33] See https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-219-humanitarian-crisis-gaza-strip-and-occupied-west-bank; and https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2026-05/gaza-s-battle-with-rising-infectious-disease-risks.html.

[34] See https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/acute-food-insecurity-and-malnutrition-remain-alarmingly-high-crises-deepen-un-eu.

[35] See https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/environmental-damage-gaza-strip-harming-human-health-threatening.

[36] See https://www.undp.org/stories/clearing-most-rubble-gaza-strip-possible-seven-years-under-right-conditions.

[37] See https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/countries-in-focus-archive/issue-142/en/; and https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166638.

[38] See https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Gaza_Reported_Impact_Snapshot_22_April_2026.pdf.

[39] See https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/reviving-gaza-s-fishing-sector-hinges-on-restoring-peace-and-safe-access-to-the-sea/en.

[40] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-5-june-2026.

[41] For information on settler violence, see A/HRC/61/70.

socioeconomic and demographic continuity in the West Bank and facilitating the de facto annexation of occupied Palestinian land.[42]

25. In 2025, a total of 240 Palestinians, including 55 children (23 per cent) were killed by either Israeli forces or settlers. Of that number, 225 were killed by Israeli forces and 9 by settlers. There are six cases where it remains unknown whether the victims were killed by Israeli forces or settlers.[43] Nearly half all deaths were in the northern governorates of Jenin and Nablus,[44] in large part due to the Israeli forces' operation Iron Wall.[45] Between 7 October 2023 and 30 June 2026, a total of 1,109 Palestinians, including at least 243 children, were killed in the West Bank.[46]

26. Settler violence, which began as sporadic and localized incidents, has been transformed into a systematized and merciless mechanism, with the perpetrators protected and often encouraged by the State, in keeping with the Israeli Government's objectives of territorial expansion and steady integration of the occupied West Bank into the State of Israel.[47]

27. As at 30 June 2026, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs had recorded at least 3,033 attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians that resulted in casualties, property damage or both.[48] Those attacks reportedly involved acts of arson, use of live ammunition, sexual violence[49] and destruction of property.[50] The average number of Palestinians injured in such incidents rose sharply, from 30 per month in 2024 to 69 per month in 2025, reaching an unprecedented average of 105 by the first quarter of 2026.[51]

28. Since 7 October 2023, attacks by settlers in the West Bank, often occurring alongside and in the context of military operations, have driven displacement on a scale not seen since the beginning of the occupation in 1967.[52] Large-scale military incursions into three refugee camps in the northern West Bank[53] have resulted in the forcible displacement of the camps' populations in their entirety; an estimated 32,000 persons remained displaced at the time of reporting. Since the beginning of 2026, more than 2,300 Palestinians have been displaced as the result of settler attacks and related access restrictions,[54] a staggering figure that surpasses the total displacements recorded in all of 2025.[55] Those displaced have not been allowed to return, and it has been reported that many homes were destroyed during these attacks.[56]

29. Displacement linked to attacks by settlers has been driven in part by the expansion of the "agricultural farm" model, which has been used to assert control

[42] A/HRC/61/70, para. 2.
[43] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-352-west-bank.
[44] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-346-west-bank.
[45] See https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1159971.
[46] See https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.
[47] See A/79/347, para. 4.
[48] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/west-bank-monthly-snapshot-casualties-property-damage-and-displacement-june-2026.
[49] See https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2026-03-16/ty-article-magazine/.premium/israeli settlers-sexually-assaulted-palestinian-man-in-jordan-valley-witnesses-say/0000019c-f58f-d9bb-adbc-ff8ff6e80000; and https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-man-says-israeli-settlers-sexually-assaulted-him-front-his-family-2026-03-20/.
[50] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-352-west-bank.
[51] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-19-march-2026.
[52] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-337-west-bank.
[53] Jenin, Nur Shams, and Tulkarm refugee camps.
[54] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-31-july-2026.
[55] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-settler-violence-displaces-more-palestinians-in-2026-than-in-all-of-2025/.
[56] See https://www.btselem.org/settler_violence_updates_list?importance=1.

over extensive areas of Palestinian grazing land.[57] According to Peace Now, in 2025, 86 new outposts were established, including 60 agricultural farms.[58] OHCHR reported[59] that the Israeli authorities have systematically implemented a range of coordinated policies aimed at deepening their hold over significant portions of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. This approach has involved facilitating the growth and formalization of settlements and outposts and expanding the infrastructure that sustains them.[60]

30. The reporting period was also marked by an acceleration of efforts to retroactively legalize outposts across the West Bank.[61] According to Peace Now, in 2025, the Government of Israel approved the establishment of 54 new official settlements, comprising 26 regularized outposts, 14 recognized neighbourhoods and 14 entirely new settlements.[62] Many of these settlements are situated deep within the West Bank, in locations that deliberately fragment Palestinian territorial continuity and further undermine the geographical viability of a two-State solution.[63] Territorial and structural fragmentation have been most acutely observed in Area C, which constitutes the majority of the West Bank. Within that area, the Israeli State exercises near-exclusive control over planning and zoning processes, thereby facilitating widespread dispossession and the imposition of severe spatial restrictions on Palestinian communities.[64]

31. In 2025, the Higher Planning Council of the Civil Administration of Israel reportedly approved 27,941 housing units, more than double the previous record number, which was recorded in 2023.[65] In the first quarter of 2026 alone, 3,009 new housing units were approved.[66] As at March 2026, the current Israeli Government, since its formation in 2022, had invested 19 billion new shekels (approximately $6.05 billion) in settlement-related infrastructure and development, ensuring the long-term entrenchment of these expansion initiatives.[67] According to Israeli sources, the Government intends to funnel hundreds of millions of new shekels in funding to support the establishment of dozens of new settlements, retroactively legalize additional outposts and directly subsidize existing settlement communities.[68]

32. During the reporting period, property destruction continued to serve as a primary mechanism of forced displacement. In 2025, 1,658 Palestinian structures were demolished across the West Bank, displacing more than 2,100 Palestinians,[69] the highest annual total on record.[70] During the first six months of 2026, 743 structures were destroyed, resulting in the displacement of some 1,000 individuals and affecting almost 30,000 persons in total.[71] Demolition-driven displacement has surged most severely in Hebron and East Jerusalem, specifically in the Bustan neighbourhood of Silwan, where the systematic destruction of Palestinian homes is directly tied to

[57] See https://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/The_Bad_Samaritan_ENG.pdf, para. 50.
[58] See https://peacenow.org.il/en/summary-of-2025-in-settlements.
[59] See A/HRC/61/70.
[60] Ibid.
[61] See https://www.amnesty.ie/global_impunity_fueling_israels_unlawful_annexation_measures_in_the_west_bank/.
[62] See https://peacenow.org.il/en/summary-of-2025-in-settlements.
[63] A/HRC/61/70, para. 38
[64] Ibid.
[65] See https://peacenow.org.il/en/summary-of-2025-in-settlements.
[66] See https://peacenow.org.il/en/475hu.
[67] See https://peacenow.org.il/en/nis-19-billion-for-settlements.
[68] See https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rkrwy07fwg.
[69] See https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition.
[70] See https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-356-west-bank.
[71] See https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition.

municipal plans to clear the area for settlement expansion.[72] These demolitions are overwhelmingly executed under the pretext that the structures lack Israeli-issued building permits, which are extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, for Palestinians to obtain.[73]

33. In parallel, Israel has implemented a series of measures aimed at advancing the de facto annexation of the West Bank. In particular, the transfer of governance functions from military to civilian Israeli authorities[74] has contributed to the erosion of the legal distinction between occupied territory and territory under sovereign Israeli jurisdiction,[75] and reveals the intent of Israel to permanently integrate the West Bank into its legal and administrative system, in contravention of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force.[76] On 15 February 2026, the Cabinet of Israel authorized the initiation of a land registration process in Area C for the first time since 1967, allocating an initial budget of 244 million new shekels (approximately $79 million) until 2030.[77] Under this process, Palestinians are required to provide formal proof of ownership that is often unattainable, thereby facilitating the large-scale designation of land as "State land", for exclusive Israeli use, and enabling the systematic reclassification of Palestinian property.[78] In practice, this mechanism facilitates large-scale land appropriation and the consolidation of territorial control, while significantly restricting Palestinian property rights. These measures may constitute unlawful annexation and extensive appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, in violation of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.[79] In 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that policies and practices of Israel amounted to and were entrenching the annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in violation of the prohibition of acquisition of territory by force, and impeding the exercise of the right to self-determination by the Palestinian people.[80]

C. Detention, torture and ill-treatment and the death penalty

34. As at May 2026, the total number of Palestinians in Israeli custody had reportedly reached 9,384 individuals, including 1,310 sentenced prisoners, 3,415 remand detainees and 3,376 administrative detainees held without trial, alongside

[72] See https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/opt-humanitarian-situation-report-2-april-2026.

[73] See https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-356-west-bank.

[74] See https://www.timesofisrael.com/security-cabinet-okays-dramatic-west-bank-policy-overhaul-deepening-israeli-control/.

[75] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/un-secretary-general-condemns-the-israeli-governments-decision-to-resume-land-registration-procedures-in-area-c-of-the-occupied-west-bank-statement/; and https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/special-rapporteur-condemns-israeli-attempts-further-annex-west-bank.

[76] See, for example, *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*, *Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2024*, p. 753, paras. 158, 170 and 172.

[77] See https://www.gov.il/he/pages/dec3882-2026. See also https://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Gov-decision-land-registration-150226.pdf; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/government-decision-land-registration.

[78] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/special-rapporteur-condemns-israeli-attempts-further-annex-west-bank.

[79] See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907/regulations-art-46?activeTab=, art. 46; and https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949, arts. 47 and 53.

[80] *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2024*, p.753, paras. 173, 179, 238 and 245.

1,283 individuals classified as "unlawful combatants".[81] In the period from 7 October 2023 to 24 June 2026, OHCHR recorded the deaths of at least 91 Palestinians (90 men and 1 boy) in Israeli custody.[82] In September 2025, OHCHR denounced the deliberate imposition by the Israeli authorities of conditions of detention amounting to torture or other forms of ill-treatment that contributed to the deaths of detainees, while a culture of impunity and the denial of access to ICRC predictably fostered extreme violence against Palestinians in Israeli jails.[83] In March 2026, a year after the first death of a child in an Israeli prison, an Israeli judge found that the 17-year boy had been "apparently starved".[84]

35. According to United Nations human rights mechanisms, as well as Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not isolated incidents, but form part of a broader pattern of institutionalized abuse, including genocide.[85] In addition, the Committee against Torture expressed deep concern about "a de facto State policy of organized and widespread torture and ill-treatment … that had gravely intensified since 7 October 2023".[86]

36. In April 2026, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict released her annual report, in which Israeli armed and security forces were listed as parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict.[87] In June, the Secretary-General, in his most recent report on children and armed conflict, noted that the United Nations had received testimony from 66 children who reported physical violence and other ill-treatment while detained by Israeli forces, and that the Organization had verified multiple incidents of conflict-related sexual violence, including as a form of torture, inflicted against 9 boys and 1 girl from the Gaza Strip (5) and the West Bank (5).[88]

37. On 31 March 2026, the Knesset enacted legislation expanding the use of the death penalty for "terrorism"-related offences; the wording and structure of the legislation indicate that it would primarily, if not exclusively, be applied to Palestinians, thereby entrenching a discriminatory system of punishment.[89] Deaths resulting from such treatment may amount to wilful killing or grave breaches engaging individual criminal responsibility. Where such conduct is systematic and carried out with the requisite *dolus specialis,* it falls under the scope of article II (b) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which prohibits the intentional infliction of serious bodily or mental harm on members of a

[81] See https://hamoked.org/prisoners-charts.php.
[82] See https://palestine.un.org/en/318923-ohchr-calls-israeli-government-urgently-protect-dr-hussam-abu-safiya-and-ensure-his-safety. Namely, 56 from Gaza, 31 from the West Bank and 4 Palestinian citizens of Israel.
[83] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ohchr-press-release-17sep25/.
[84] See https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-israel-prison-abuse-west-bank-1889d1a11da9851a1940671ba0de4963.
[85] See, for example, A/HRC/61/71; https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/202601_living_hell_eng.pdf; https://www.phr.org.il/en/palestinian-deaths-behind-bars-eng/; and https://pchrgaza.org/palestinian-prisoners-day-unprecedented-escalation-of-torture-enforced-disappearance-and-arbitrary-detention-in-israeli-prisons/.
[86] CAT/C/ISR/CO/6, para. 28.
[87] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-secretary-general-s-2026-321/.
[88] A/80/723-S/2026/357, paras. 88 and 91.
[89] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/israels-death-penalty-law-constitutes-discriminatory-regime-capital.

protected group.[90] The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that the law was patently inconsistent with the obligations of Israel under international law, including in relation to the right to life, raised serious concerns about due process violations and must be promptly repealed.[91] In addition, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination urged Israel to immediately repeal the law and end all policies and practices that amount to racial discrimination against and segregation of Palestinians.[92]

D. Shrinking civic space

38. During the reporting period, OHCHR reported a severe intensification of measures, laws and policies aimed at shrinking civil society space, silencing criticism of Israeli policies and criminalizing advocacy and accountability efforts in support of Palestinian rights.[93]

39. Individuals, including non-governmental organization (NGO) staff documenting the atrocities committed in Gaza and the West Bank, were systematically targeted by Israeli security forces and settlers, often acting jointly, and subjected to surveillance, intimidation, violence and physical assault, in some cases resulting in death, as well as arrest, detention and travel bans. In addition, NGO offices were raided and NGO bank accounts and property were seized. Meanwhile, restrictions on the international humanitarian system continued, hindering its ability to provide life-saving and critical aid to the populations of devastated Gaza and the West Bank, thereby threatening the very survival of Palestinians as a group.

Civil society organizations

40. As the Special Committee has reported previously, Israel continued to discredit and dry out funding for Palestinian civil society and paralyse human rights defenders, humanitarians, journalists and community leaders through the organization of delegitimization and disinformation smear campaigns, labelling them “terrorists” or “antisemites”[94] in order to justify repressive and illegal measures.

41. In September 2025, the Secretary-General reported that six well-established and professional Palestinian NGOs were facing serious funding-related challenges.[95] The six NGOs, which Israel designated as “terrorist organizations” in 2021,[96] have been included since 2022 in the report of the Secretary-General on cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights, which documents reprisals and intimidations for such cooperation.[97]

42. On 10 April 2026, as a direct result of defamation campaigns and impediments, Defence for Children International – Palestine, which, for 35 years, had investigated, documented and exposed grave human rights violations against Palestinian children,

[90] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II (b). See also A/HRC/61/71, paras. 9–18.
[91] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ohchr-statement-death-penalty-israel/.
[92] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/05/israels-discriminatory-death-penalty-law-marks-grave-human-rights.
[93] See https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unprecedented-assault-civic-space-occupied-palestinian-territory-enar.
[94] A/80/365, para. 28.
[95] The Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, Al Haq, the Bisan Center for Research and Development, Defence for Children International – Palestine, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees.
[96] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/10/un-experts-condemn-israels-designation-palestinian-human-rights-defenders.
[97] A/HRC/60/62, annex II, paras. 93 and 94.

provided legal aid and advocated for children's rights, announced that it was ceasing operations.[98]

Journalists and freedom of the press

43. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in the period from October 2023 to 25 June 2026, Israel had killed 207 journalists in Gaza and injured 174 others, while 2 other journalists remained missing.[99] In addition, Israel has arrested and detained at least 102 Palestinian journalists and 1 media worker since October 2023, 36 of whom remained detained as at 3 June 2026.[100] In February 2026, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that, among the 59 released Palestinian journalists that it had interviewed, all but one had reported being subjected to sexual, physical and mental violence in detention.[101] In May 2026, Reporters Without Borders shared additional testimony from Palestinian journalists who had been subjected to torture and ill-treatment while detained by the Israeli army and the Israel Security Agency.[102]

44. Israel also scaled up its efforts to further reduce the ability of the media to report on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In December 2025, the Knesset adopted the Law on the Prevention of Harm to State Security by a Foreign Broadcasting Body (Temporary Provision), 5770-2025 ("Foreign Media Law"). The Law extends to December 2027 the validity of provisions adopted in 2024 that allow the Prime Minister of Israel to determine, outside emergency conditions, that the content broadcast on a foreign channel is "materially detrimental to the security of the state"[103] and authorize, among others, the executive authorities to order a content provider to cease broadcasting a channel and the closure of the offices of a channel in Israeli territory.[104] Since October 2023, the Foreign Press Association, which represents journalists working for international news organizations reporting from Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, has repeatedly made requests of the Israeli authorities and petitioned the Supreme Court of Israel to secure free and independent access to Gaza for the press.[105] However, at the time of writing, international media were still barred from independently entering the Strip.

Humanitarian organizations

45. At the start of the reporting period, almost 500 humanitarian workers and 1,580 health workers had been killed in Gaza, and all but one medical facility had been fully or partially destroyed.[106] Nonetheless, over the reporting period, Israel continued to severely restrict the entry of vital humanitarian assistance and scaled up its assault on

[98] See https://eurochild.org/news/defence-for-children-international-ceases-operations-in-palestine/.
[99] See https://cpj.org/2023/10/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-war/.
[100] See https://cpj.org/2023/10/arrests-of-palestinian-journalists-since-start-of-israel-gaza-war/.
[101] See https://www.dw.com/en/palestinian-journalists-tortured-in-israeli-prisons-report/a-76027348.
[102] See https://rsf.org/en/journalists-gaza-treated-inhumanely-israeli-army-and-shin-bet-israel-s-prisons.
[103] See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30971.
[104] Ibid.
[105] See https://foreignpressassociation.online/30-4-2026/; and https://foreignpressassociation.online/2026/01/28/fpa-deeply-disappointed-in-supreme-courts-postponement-of-gaza-press-ruling-january-28-2026/. See also https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-883158.
[106] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-30-july-2025.

humanitarian organizations' capacity to bring assistance to survivors living amid the rubble of what used to be Gaza and to Palestinians in the West Bank.[107]

46. In early December 2025, United Nations agencies and NGOs reported that they were able to deliver only 14,600 tents for 85,000 people, leaving 1.3 million Palestinians without adequate winter shelter.[108] Several people, including six children, died from hypothermia, drowning or cold-related injuries as a direct result of action taken by Israel to prevent the entry of protective shelter.[109]

47. In December 2025, the Israeli authorities informed 37 international aid organizations that they would have to cease operations in the entire Occupied Palestinian Territory by the end of February 2026[110] should they fail to comply with new regulations that infringe on the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence.[111] Those organizations were running or supporting 60 per cent of field hospitals and all the stabilization centres for children with severe malnutrition,[112] and delivering 42 per cent of all water, sanitation and hygiene services.[113] As noted by special procedures mandate holders, among the grounds for denying registration of these organizations were, notably, the failure to affirm the character of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state" and the refusal to submit the personal data of Palestinian staff, including names, contact details and identification numbers.[114]

48. Despite warnings from the humanitarian country team that the humanitarian response in Gaza would not be able to continue as the result of that decision,[115] which would lead to the closure of one in three health facilities in Gaza and loss of care access for more than 20,000 patients,[116] the High Court of Israel, which had temporarily suspended implementation of the decision in February 2026, ruled on 20 May 2026 to uphold the new regulations imposed by the Government of Israel.[117]

49. The Government of Israel continued to dismantle the capacity of the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. In violation of privileges and immunities accorded to UNRWA[118] and despite the advisory opinion issued in October 2025 by the International Court of Justice on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international

[107] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-355-gaza-strip; and https://unsco.unmissions.org/en/news/full-transcript-un-secretary-generals-press-encounter-gaza.

[108] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-situation-report-no-42.

[109] See https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166750.

[110] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/outrageous-suspension-numerous-aid-agencies-gaza; https://www.gov.il/en/pages/spoke-common091224; and https://www.un.org/unispal/document/53-international-ngos-warn-israels-recent-registration-measures-will-impede-critical-humanitarian-action-non-un-document/.

[111] A/80/365, para. 27; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/israel-ban-37-aid-groups-makes-life-unbearable-genocide-survivors-palestine; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/israels-new-ingo-registration-measures-are-grave-threat-humanitarian-operations-and-international-law-55-organisations-say-6-may-2025.

[112] See https://www.ochaopt.org/content/un-agencies-and-ngos-call-immediate-lifting-impediments-humanitarian-access-and-ngo-operations-occupied; and https://www.savethechildren.org/us/about-us/media-and-news/2025-press-releases/gaza-four-out-five-children-face-catastrophic-levels.

[113] See https://www.savethechildren.org/us/about-us/media-and-news/2025-press-releases/gaza-four-out-five-children-face-catastrophic-levels.

[114] See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30240.

[115] See https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166622.

[116] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/hct-statement-17dec25/.

[117] See https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-nixes-ngos-petition-against-new-security-regulations-on-aid/.

[118] See https://www.un.org/unispal/document/statement-un-secretary-general-on-the-demolition-of-the-unrwa-sheikh-jarrah-compound/.

organizations and third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory,[119] Israeli forces raided the Agency's headquarters in Shaykh Jarrah, East Jerusalem, on 8 December 2025, confiscated furniture and stated that they would cut off electricity and water to UNRWA buildings, including schools and clinics.[120] On 20 January 2026, Israeli forces began the demolition of the Agency's headquarters. The Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and the Minister of National Security of Israel, Itamar Ben-Gvir, were present at the demolition. The Deputy Mayor posted celebratory messages and videos on his social media account, in which he presented UNRWA as "the Nazi enemy" and called for action to "throw out and annihilate all members of UNRWA".[121]

Solidarity movements

50. During the reporting period, Israel continued to repress those who express solidarity with and organize solidarity activities in support of Palestinians, acting with particular severity towards those who participated in the Freedom Flotilla Coalition and Global Sumud Flotilla initiatives. Although the International Court of Justice, in its July 2024 advisory opinion, concluded that the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was unlawful, all flotilla initiatives aimed at breaking the illegal siege of Gaza and delivering humanitarian assistance by sea to the Strip were blocked. The boats were illegally intercepted in international waters and some were seized[122] or damaged, and hundreds of participants were arbitrarily arrested, forcibly transferred to Israel and detained. It is reported that, between September 2025 and May 2026, Israel abducted and detained hundreds of persons who participated in the flotillas. Dozens of the participants detained in September 2025 reported that, following their arrest, they were subjected to ill-treatment in detention. In May 2026, after 430 flotilla participants had been transferred to Israel,[123] Mr. Ben-Gvir posted a video on social media in which he proudly shows them being subjected to inhuman, cruel and degrading treatment.[124] The Minister of Transport of Israel also boasted about the degrading treatment to which those whom she labelled as "terror supporters" had been subjected.[125] Several flotilla members reported physical assault, sexual abuse and rape.[126]

[119] See A/80/502.

[120] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/demolition-unrwa-premises-symbolic-israels-attack-united-nations-system-un.

[121] See https://x.com/arieh_king/status/2013585280398197052?s=20; https://x.com/arieh_king/status/2013494643699151178?s=20; and https://x.com/arieh_king/status/2013491778645590298?s=20. See also https://youtube.com/shorts/wadYZPDeyuU?si=CXG42aw-xZPdBUGi.

[122] On 20 May 2026, the District Court of Haifa reportedly ordered that 11 vessels seized during the October 2025 Sumud flotilla be transferred to State ownership. See https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-896796.

[123] See https://x.com/IsraelMFA/status/2056838154309763311?s=20.

[124] See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/22/flotilla-video-ben-gvir-template-televised-abuse-honed-palestinians.

[125] See https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYlU48UAcAu/.

[126] See https://www.globalsumudflotilla.org/press/global-sumud-flotilla-volunteers-recount-abuse-on-torture-boat/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/22/gaza-flotilla-activists-allege-sexual-assault-and-in-israeli-detention; https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/22/middleeast/gaza-flotilla-activists-sexual-assault-israel-intl; and https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2026/06/05/french-prosecutors-open-war-crime-probe-over-israel-treatment-of-gaza-flotilla-activists_6754182_7.html.

51. Israeli citizens and organizations promoting alternative approaches to the armed conflict and engaged in the protection of Palestinians have been increasingly subjected to violence and repression,[127] notably during the olive harvest season.

V. Situation of human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan and adjacent territories

52. Throughout the reporting period, Israel took steps to consolidate and expand its occupation of the Syrian Golan, maintaining and formalizing the military control that it had established over the area of separation following the fall of the former Syrian Government in December 2024 and increasingly conducting incursions in the southern Syrian Arab Republic.

53. In February 2026, OHCHR reported that Israel had established multiple military posts extending from Mount Hermon to the city of Qunaytirah and parts of western Dar'a.[128] On 17 April 2026, Mr. Netanyahu declared the establishment of a "deep security buffer zone" marked by a "yellow line" encompassing "Mont Hermon, through the Golan Heights and down to Yarmouk", and said that Israeli forces stationed there would continue to defend against threats.[129] The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) documented numerous violations of the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, including the unauthorized presence of Iron Dome batteries, artillery and multiple rocket launcher systems belonging to Israel on the Alpha side,[130] as well as the firing of tank shells across the ceasefire line.

54. It is reported that the expanded Israeli military presence has profoundly affected the human rights of Syrian civilians. Incursions by Israeli forces into villages in the Governorates of Qunaytirah, Dar'a and Rif Dimashq have involved the establishment of temporary checkpoints, periodic searches of civilian homes and the collection of personal data.[131] In June 2026, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reported that, since December 2024, Israeli forces had detained at least 250 people in the southern Syrian Arab Republic, including children, 50 of whom remained in detention, with some transferred to prisons in the occupied Syrian Golan, raising serious concerns about arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance.[132]

55. The Special Committee received reports regarding the deliberate destruction of civilian property and sources of agricultural livelihood. In May 2026, Amnesty International reported that at least 23 civilian structures had been destroyed in three villages in Qunaytirah Governorate, including in the village of Hamidiyah, where Israeli bulldozers demolished homes, gardens and agricultural land, destroying walnut, pomegranate and olive trees, without military necessity.[133] The Israeli forces

[127] A/HRC/55/72, para. 46; https://x.com/JustHerds/status/2062953535013089683?s=20; https://x.com/AlonLeeGreen/status/2055332669999726696?s=20; https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-335-west-bank; https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-339-west-bank; and https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/season-protection-snapshot-west-bank-olive-harvest-2025-reporting-period-1-27-october-2025.

[128] A/HRC/61/70, para. 43.

[129] See https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement-from-pm-netanyahu-17-april-2026.

[130] S/2026/157, para. 11.

[131] Al-Marsad, "Violations by Israeli occupation forces in Syrian areas occupied after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime on December 8, 2024: July–September 2025", November 2025.

[132] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Human rights update on Syria", 28 April 2026.

[133] Amnesty International, "Syria: Israel's destruction of civilian homes in Quneitra amounts to war crimes", 14 May 2026.

also systematically bulldozed vegetation, deliberately burned agricultural land and deployed light aircraft to spray a chemical substance over the area of separation, causing significant environmental damage.[134]

56. Syrian civilians faced displacement and severe restrictions on their freedom of movement and access to livelihoods. An Israeli incursion on 28 November 2025 into the town of Bayt Jinn resulted in the death of 13 people and injuries to 24 others, and caused the prolonged displacement of approximately 1,400 residents.[135] Throughout April 2026, Israeli forces blocked farmers from various towns, including Abidin, Jamlah, Kuyah and Ma'arriyah, from accessing their agricultural lands, critically hampering civilians' access to livelihood.[136]

57. The reporting period witnessed the unprecedented encroachment of Israeli settlers into the area of separation and adjacent Syrian territory. It was reported that, in May 2026, approximately 60 Israeli settlers linked to the Pioneers of Bashan movement, a group established in 2025 with the explicit aim of founding permanent settlements in the southern Syrian Arab Republic, had entered the area west of Hadar before being removed by Israeli forces. In addition, settlers were accused of confiscating livestock belonging to Syrian residents in Jamlah.[137]

58. In keeping with the "greater Israel" vision, the Government of Israel accelerated its efforts to alter the demographic composition and physical character of the occupied Syrian Golan. On 16 April 2026, the Cabinet of Israel approved a comprehensive five-year plan (2026–2030), under which 1 billion new shekels (approximately $334 million) have been allocated to develop the Golan and establish Katzrin as the territory's "first city", with the stated goal of transferring 3,000 Israeli families into the area.[138]

59. Israeli exploitation of natural resources in the occupied Syrian Golan continued unabated, in violation of General Assembly resolutions reaffirming Syrian sovereignty over the territory and its natural wealth.[139] The Genesis Wind project, which comprises 39 turbines with a capacity of 207 MW and covers thousands of dunums of Syrian agricultural land, remained operational, providing electricity to Israeli settlements and the Israeli national grid.[140]

60. The Special Committee is concerned about reports of deteriorating health and humanitarian conditions in the occupied Golan. In May 2026, the World Health Assembly mandated a multidisciplinary fact-finding mission to assess the health conditions of the Syrian population in the occupied Syrian Golan, including prisoners and detainees. However, at the time of writing, Israel had not granted the mission access to the territory.[141]

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[134] See S/2026/157, para. 8; and Al-Marsad, "Al-Marsad calls on the Israeli occupation authorities to cease aerial spraying of chemical pesticides over Syrian lands adjacent to the ceasefire line", 10 February 2026.

[135] See https://sana.sy/en/syria/2280388. See also Etana Syria, "Brief: recent developments in south-west Syria", 20 May 2026.

[136] Etana Syria, "Brief: recent developments in south-west Syria".

[137] Ibid. For additional background information, see https://sijil-sy.org/16079 (in Arabic only); and Cian Ward, "Pioneers of Bashan: the Israeli settlers eyeing land in Syria", New Arab, 20 April 2026.

[138] Diana Bletter, "Government approves 5-year, billion-shekel plan to develop Golan, give it its 1st city", *The Times of Israel*, April 2026. See also Human Rights Watch, "Israel bankrolls war crimes in occupied Syrian Golan", 28 April 2026.

[139] General Assembly resolution 80/81.

[140] See https://enlightenergy.com/project/genesis/.

[141] World Health Organization, document A/79/11.

VI. Lebanon

61. The Special Committee was informed that, during the reporting period, the Israeli forces continued to occupy locations in southern Lebanon where they had set up positions in October 2024.[142] Almost daily operations by Israeli forces, after and despite the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, had resulted in at least 139 civilian deaths in Lebanon as at 1 March 2026 and had prevented approximately 64,000 displaced persons from returning to their homes.[143] Southern Lebanon was the area of the country that was most affected by the 2023–2024 escalation and the operations that continued afterwards.[144]

62. The re-escalation in hostilities from 2 March 2026 between Hizbullah and Israel dramatically worsened the human rights situation across Lebanon. Israeli leaders have reportedly expressed their intention to transform southern Lebanon, in particular, into another Gaza or permanently establish an Israeli presence in the area.[145] According to the Government of Lebanon, between 2 March and 28 June, Israeli attacks resulted in the killing of 4,247 people and the injury of 12,195 others across the country,[146] amid widespread destructions of civilian objects, including extensive demolition of villages along the border.[147] The deadliest attacks by Israel against Lebanon occurred on the day when Pakistan, in its capacity as mediator, announced that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, "along with their allies", had agreed to a ceasefire on 8 April, which, according to Pakistan also applied to Lebanon.[148] Mr. Netanyahu, however, announced that the ceasefire did not apply to Lebanon.[149] Moments following his announcement, some 100 Israeli attacks were carried out across Lebanon, reportedly resulting in the killing of more than 350 people and the injury of more than 1,200 others.[150]

63. Israeli forces repeatedly ordered all the residents of more than 100 towns and villages in southern Lebanon[151] to move north of the Litani River and then north of the Zahrani River. Those orders and the displacement orders issued for other areas covered more than 14 per cent of Lebanese territory and affected more than 1 million people in total,[152] of whom more than 700,000 remained displaced as at the end of

[142] A/80/365, paras. 67–69.
[143] See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/lebanon/update-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-lebanon-23-04-2026.pdf.
[144] World Bank, *Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA): March 2025* (Washington, D.C., 2025), p. 10; and https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2025/08/israel-lebanon-extensive-destruction/.
[145] See, for example, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ry2scsmc11e; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/05/03/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-gaza-destruction.html; https://www.instagram.com/p/DW8cluNCL11/; and https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-politics/2026-03-26/ty-article/.premium/no-innocent-children-israeli-lawmaker-defends-killing-of-palestinian-family/0000019d-2976-d8a3-abff-39764b2e0000#:~:text=Speaking,Israel,-%2E.
[146] See https://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/en/news/222672/aggression-toll-4247-martyrs-12195-wounded-2.
[147] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/turk-condemns-deadly-wave-israeli-strikes-lebanon; and https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/news/unifil-stays-the-course-despite-violence-in-south-lebanon.
[148] See https://x.com/CMShehbaz/status/2041665043423752651.
[149] See https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/2042310198157512893?s=20.
[150] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/turk-condemns-deadly-wave-israeli-strikes-lebanon; https://www.ifrc.org/article/time-stood-still-humanitarians-story-black-wednesday-lebanon; and https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1503009/talks-expected-in-pakistan-between-us-iran-new-clashes-between-hezbollah-israel-in-khiam-bint-jbeil-live.html.
[151] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2026/03/lebanon-israeli-blanket-displacement-orders-bring-more-misery.
[152] See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/lebanon/update-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-lebanon-23-04-2026.pdf.

June.[153] According to OHCHR, Israeli operations, particularly in southern Lebanon, had degraded the environment, destroying and contaminating farmland, forests and soil and damaging water systems, amid reports of the use of white phosphorus ammunition, with anticipated long-term impacts on economic, social and cultural rights.[154] In April, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projected that some 1.24 million people would face high levels of acute food insecurity by August 2026, with the biggest increases coming in populations that are in the crisis or emergency phases in southern Lebanon.[155] On 26 June, Israel, Lebanon and the United States signed a trilateral framework agreement[156] that includes provisions for a phased process linking the gradual redeployment of Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory to the verified disarmament of non-State armed groups and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as recovery support. The framework agreement stipulates that the Government of Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. While the conclusion of that agreement raised hopes of continued de-escalation, the Special Committee remains concerned, given that Israel, over the past three years, has generally continued to carry out military actions in Gaza, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon, despite any ceasefires or disengagement agreements that had been agreed upon. Strengthened international attention, support and persuasion are critical in order to ensure that all parties respect the ceasefire and the large humanitarian needs are met.[157]

VII. Conclusions

64. In the light of the information available, the Special Committee notes with concern that the Government of Israel continued its genocidal campaign[158] against Palestinians during the reporting period. The situation in Gaza, of which no part has been spared, is deeply troubling. Israeli forces control almost 70 per cent of the Strip and are forcing an exhausted, psychologically traumatized population into an ever-shrinking area. Moreover, Israel apparently continues to use humanitarian access as a bargaining chip in negotiations and as a weapon of collective punishment, even as most of the population of Gaza remained dependent on humanitarian aid. The Special Committee further notes that it is morally unconscionable to tolerate, let alone defend, a status quo that perpetuates such suffering.

65. According to publicly available reports, in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the Government of Israel has effectively supported and funded and actively encouraged settler violence, in an effort to forcibly displace the Palestinian population and prevent the establishment of a viable Palestinian State. In parallel, cultural cleansing, the appropriation of Palestinian heritage and the Judaization of occupied lands, including East Jerusalem, have been employed to reshape the demographic and cultural landscape, in apparent furtherance of the “greater Israel” vision.

[153] See https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-39-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-29-june-2026.
[154] See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/lebanon/update-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-lebanon-23-04-2026.pdf.
[155] See https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1163301/.
[156] See https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon.
[157] See https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-venezuela-lebanon-occupied-palestinian-territory-sudan-afghanistan.
[158] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/06/israel-continues-commit-genocide-and-other-atrocity-crimes-deliberately.

66. During the reporting period, the Special Committee noted serious violations of international law against Palestinians in detention, including a sharp increase in arrests and reports of torture, starvation, sexual violence and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Evidence documented by United Nations mechanisms and Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations suggests that these abuses are systemic rather than isolated, reflecting entrenched practices within the detention system. Allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, including against children in detention, raised further concerns. Under the new death penalty law, Palestinians detained by Israel are at risk of an irreversible violation of their rights to life and a fair trial. Serious bodily and mental harm inflicted on Palestinians in custody is part of a broader genocidal pattern of violations. Urgent measures are required to ensure independent monitoring, end impunity, protect detainees and ensure full compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law.

67. The contraction of civic space across Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory was marked by intensifying campaigns of repression and delegitimization aimed at silencing criticism and advocacy for Palestinian rights and obstructing accountability for alleged international crimes. These actions collectively undermined the ability of independent actors to document violations, provide assistance and advocate for the protection of fundamental rights. The closure of a long-standing, reputable child rights NGO illustrates the cumulative effect of those measures on the capacity of civil society to monitor, report and protect against abuses. The killing, injury, detention and reported torture of journalists, combined with legal restrictions on media activity and the continued ban on independent access to Gaza for the international media, continued to severely limit independent reporting on alleged international crimes and erase evidence. Meanwhile, ongoing and new restrictions on humanitarian organizations directly impaired the humanitarian response. Moreover, the repression of solidarity movements engaged in peaceful advocacy and providing a protective presence reflected a broader effort to suppress dissent and discourage public engagement on Palestinian rights. Taken together, these developments demonstrate that there has been an extensive erosion of civic space, with profound implications for accountability and the protection of human rights.

68. In the view of the Committee, the overall purpose of the policies and practices of the Israeli State during the reporting period was to make life in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unbearable, in order not only to retain its supremacy over an occupied people, but also to cause ethnic cleansing. Various measures adopted by Israel have curtailed civic space and strangled the occupied population through red tape, laws and policies that are discriminatory and aimed at dismantling, disconnecting and dehumanizing the occupied Palestinian communities.

69. Meanwhile, Israel further consolidated and expanded its control over the occupied Syrian Golan and adjacent areas of the southern Syrian Arab Republic, as well as southern Lebanon, and it significantly expanded its military presence beyond previously established lines. Together with government-backed settlement expansion, demographic engineering and the continued exploitation of Syrian natural resources, those actions had serious human rights and humanitarian consequences for Syrian civilians across the occupied areas. In Lebanon, this resulted in mass casualties and extensive destruction, raising concerns of forced displacement. The Special Committee reiterates that, in order to ensure peace in the Middle East region, it is necessary for Israel to stop occupying or annexing neighbouring States and territories and committing violations of the human rights of their inhabitants in pursuit of its security.[159]

[159] A/80/365, para. 76. See also Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

VIII. Recommendations

70. **The State of Israel should:**

(a) **Review and implement the Special Committee's previous recommendations;**

(b) **End its unlawful occupation of the Palestinian territory, cease new settlement activity and evacuate all settlers, in line with the July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and withdraw from all occupied territories, including in the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon;**

(c) **Respect the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement with the Syrian Arab Republic and reverse all steps to occupy additional lands;**

(d) **Respect the sovereignty of neighbouring States;**

(e) **Ensure the immediate, unrestricted delivery of large-scale humanitarian assistance to all people in need in Gaza through organizations that adhere to core humanitarian principles;**

(f) **Ensure accountability for perpetrators and provide effective remedies for victims, including by taking measures in line with the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death to investigate potentially unlawful deaths and suspected extrajudicial executions;**

(g) **Stop attacks against civilians, including children, human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, medical staff, United Nations personnel and entities, journalists and media personnel, aid workers, civil defence personnel and emergency responders;**

(h) **Consider repealing the "Death Penalty for Terrorists Law";**

(i) **Consider repealing or amending restrictive laws and policies that govern international NGO registration and staff visas, in order to ensure timely, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures, and delink visa approvals from politicized registration criteria.**

71. **The General Assembly and Member States should urgently consider:**

(a) **Imposing appropriate sanctions and a full arms embargo, so that Israel ceases its assault on the Palestinian people and fully withdraws from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in accordance with the advisory opinion issued on 19 July 2024 by the International Court of Justice; rescinds its annexation of the Syrian Golan, in accordance with Security Council resolution 497 (1981); and withdraws from southern Lebanon, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006);**

(b) **Persuading all relevant parties to undertake political dialogue in good faith, with the objective of achieving a two-State solution;**

(c) **Formally recognizing the State of Palestine;**

(d) **Providing financial support to the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture,[160] in order to ensure that torture victims have access to timely, survivor-centred, trauma-informed and gender-responsive medical, psychological, legal, social and humanitarian assistance;**

[160] See https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/funding-and-budget/trust-funds/united-nations-voluntary-fund-victims-torture.

(e) **Mandating OHCHR to include all business enterprises involved in or profiting from the occupation by Israel of Palestinian and Syrian territories in the database established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 31/36 and 53/25;**

(f) **Using other intergovernmental organizations and regional or transregional organizations and groups to apply stronger leverage on Israel;**

(g) **Using financial, cultural, economic, political and diplomatic influence to protect religious sites, including the Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre;**

(h) **Preventing the provision of any economic, financial, technical, military or security support to Israel that contributes to the maintenance and expansion of settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan, while establishing regular, data-driven monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track settlement expansion, land confiscation, resource exploitation and related infrastructure developments.**

72. **In addition, the Committee recommends that:**

(a) **Business enterprises and investors conduct heightened human rights due diligence on all operations, contracts, value chains, investments and clients linked to occupied territories, and that they end or avoid business relationships that may contribute to human rights violations in the context of settlement-building and movement restrictions, displacement, surveillance, land confiscation and exploitation of natural resources;**

(b) **Universities, research institutions and professional bodies protect academic freedom while conducting heightened human rights due diligence on partnerships, grants, exchanges, investments, procurement and technology transfer arrangements;**

(c) **Media organizations and digital platforms strengthen conflict-sensitive reporting by using precise legal and factual terminology and avoiding passive or dehumanizing language on civilian harm and the suppression of legitimate human rights documentation and advocacy.**