




January 20, 2013

Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations Iran supports the military buildup of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and seeks to rebuild their military capabilities after Operation Pillar of Defense, especially their rocket-launching networks (Full Version)



Posters thanking Iran in four languages hung in the Gaza Strip after Operation Pillar of Defense (Qudsnet website, November 29, 2012). In our assessment the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization with close relations to Iran, was responsible for the posters.

Overview

1. The military capabilities of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were revealed in Operation Pillar of Defense. Those capabilities were the product of massive Iranian support constructed around an arsenal of many thousands of rockets, both standard and manufactured by the terrorist organizations themselves (using Iranian technological know-how). They included medium-range Fajr-5 rockets (made in Iran) and M75s (manufactured in the Gaza Strip). The massive rocket fire targeting Israeli civilian population centers, including a number of rockets fired at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, was made possible by Iran's support for the terrorist organizations.¹

¹ Most of the terrorist organizations' medium-range rockets were destroyed by the IDF at the beginning of Operation Pillar of Defense. The collateral capability of the rockets remaining in the hands of Hamas and



Model of a Fajr-5 rocket in a display of weapons used by the Palestinian terrorist organizations during Operation Pillar of Defense. The display was organized by the PIJ at the Ali Ibn Abu Taleb mosque in Rafah (Jerusalem Brigades website, December 26, 2012).

An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket. Its range is 75 kilometers, or 46.6 miles.



Direct Fajr-5 hit on a home in Rishon Letzion, south of Tel Aviv (Israel Police Force Facebook page, November 20, 2012).

2. Aid from Iran to Hamas and the PIJ in the years before operative arrived in the Gaza Strip **overland, by air and by sea, facilitated by border-crossing networks of smugglers and merchants.** The main route for smuggling arms was from **Iran to Sudan** and from **Sudan to Egypt and into the Gaza Strip** through the smuggling

the PIJ was sufficient to fire ten rockets targeting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, ten of which either fell or were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. Five of them were Fajr-5s and five were M75s.

tunnels controlled by Hamas. The sea route was also used, as revealed on March 15, 2011 when **the freighter *Victoria* was seized by the IDF**. The ship was carrying arms bound for the Gaza Strip by way of Egypt, whose arrival would upgrade military capabilities of the terrorist organizations. Among the weapons on board the *Victoria* were C704 anti-ship missiles, which could be used to attack not only military and civilian vessels but also **strategic targets in the southern Israeli cities of Ashdod and Ashqelon**.

3. Until Operation Pillar of Defense, Iran and the terrorist organizations supported by it were careful, for security and political considerations, **to keep secret Iran's military aid and the network smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip**. A recent indication of the network and Iran's military support was the **exposure of weapons stores in Sudan**, which were attacked in October 2012. The media reported that **the weapons were Iranian** and were intended for terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip [Hamas and the PIJ].

4. Towards the end of Operation Pillar of Defense **Iran decided to reveal that it had been giving military aid to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip**. In our assessment, that was because of **Iran's deep frustration** with the way Egypt and other Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Qatar, had made political and propaganda capital from their support for Hamas during Operation Pillar of Defense. On the other hand, the role of Iran before Operation Pillar of Defense, that of providing the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip with most of their military hardware and support, **was being overshadowed**.

5. By exposing its military aid Iran hoped, in our assessment, to make political capital at the expense of countries like Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. In addition, the central role of Egypt in the understanding which led to the end of Operation Pillar of Defense caused Iran to fear that existing cracks in the so-called "resistance camp" **might widen and the Muslim axis led by Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood might become stronger**.

6. However, as a result **Iran, the PIJ and Hezbollah initiated a media campaign showering praise on Iran's military, financial and technological support for the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip** (See Appendix A). The campaign was joined by Hamas spokesmen, who alongside praise for Iran were careful to reiterate Hamas' independence and lack of dependence on Iran.

Institutions and individuals leading the Iranian support for the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip

7. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards' Qods Force (IRG-QF) is an elite Iranian unit that spearheads the export of the Islamic Revolution beyond the borders of Iran. Among other functions, the Qods Force deals with strengthening the political and military power of the so-called "resistance camp." One of the ways it does that is by taking responsibility for **transporting military support to the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas and the PIJ**. That includes smuggling weapons to the Gaza Strip, training terrorist operatives, transmitting technological know-how and providing financial support.²

8. **Two prominent, high-ranking** Qods Force officers, conspicuous in the support provided to the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip:

- 1) **Qassem Suleimani**, commander of the Qods Force, responsible for integrating support for the Palestinian terrorist organization organizations at high levels in Iran.



General Qassem Suleimani, Qods Force commander (Al-Quds website, November 12, 2011)

- 2) **Ismail Qaani**, deputy commander of the Qods Force, extensively involved in providing military support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

² For further information about the Qods Force see the August 7, 2012 bulletin "The Qods Force, an elite unit of the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, spearheads Iran's global terrorist campaign. The terrorist attack in Bulgaria was, in our assessment, part of the campaign."

Iran's intention to rebuild the terrorist organization's military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip

9. The Middle East upheaval of the past two years **caused a serious political dispute between Iran and Hamas**. It has been expressed in the rupture of relations between Hamas and the Syrian regime (Iran's strategic ally), and by Hamas' increasing orientation towards on Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood administration. In addition, there is Qatar's financial aid to Hamas and Turkey's political and propaganda support, both of which were evident during Operation Pillar of Defense. Nevertheless, **Hamas' dependence on Iran for military support is still strong**, and is, in our assessment, a necessary condition for rebuilding the military infrastructure damaged by Operation Pillar of Defense.³ **On the other hand, Iran has a clear interest to rebuild and upgrade the Palestinian rocket infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and to maintain Hamas affiliation with the "resistance camp."**

10. Thus, in our assessment, Iran and Hamas have a **common interest in continuing Iranian military support** after Operation Pillar of Defense **despite their political dispute**. That can be seen in **remarks made by Iranians regarding their intention to continue Iran's support for the Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip**. PIJ leader Ramadan Shallah said in a recent speech that the arrival of **weapons from Iran though Egypt would "continue in the future as well"** (See Appendix A). In addition, a Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese newspaper reported that Hassan Nasrallah, meeting with Hezbollah operatives, said that **Iran, as it had in the past, would continue sending "large quantities of high-quality weapons" to Hamas** (Al-Akhbar, Lebanon, December 8, 2012).

11. Thus in our assessment **Iran can be expected to support an effort aimed at rebuilding the Hamas and PIJ military networks** damaged in Operation Pillar of Defense. **Special attention will be paid to medium-range rockets**, whose existence in the Gaza Strip serves Iran's clear interest in creating **a rocket threat to Israel from both the north** (through Hezbollah) **and the south** (through Hamas and the PIJ). It will be done, in our assessment, even at the price of increasing tension with **Egypt**. Egypt was the broker of the understandings reached at the end of Operation Pillar of Defense, and through its territory most of the smuggled weapons can be expected to pass on their way from Iran to the Gaza Strip. The media have reported **that the**

³ Hamas has other sources of weapons, such as **Libya**. However, in our assessment they cannot replace Iran as a source of military aid.

smuggling tunnels along the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip have returned to their pre-Operation Pillar of Defense level of operations (Al-Ghad, December 16, 2012; AP, December 12, 2012).

Appendices

12. This bulletin has the following appendices:

- 1) Exposing Iranian military aid to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad after Operation Pillar of Defense.
- 2) Kinds of Iranian military aid to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip between Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense.
- 3) Examples of weapons and technological know-how originating in Iran.
- 4) Weapons smuggling network from Iran to the Gaza Strip.

Appendix A

Exposing Iranian Military Aid to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad after Operation Pillar of Defense

Overview

1. In the four years since Operation Cast Lead, Iran has played a major role in rebuilding and upgrading the military capabilities of Hamas (whose political relations with Iran have been in dispute as a result of the rebellion in Syria) and the PIJ. Iran's central role in providing military aid has been manifested by **the supply of high-quality weapons, especially medium-range rockets, used by Hamas and the PIJ in Operation Pillar of Defense**. In addition, Iran has assisted Hamas and the PIJ by **having their operatives trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards' Qods Force, providing them with financial aid, and helping them with the technological know-how for local weapons production**.

2. Prior to Operation Pillar of Defense, **security and political considerations kept the Iranians and the Palestinian terrorist organizations from public disclosure of the Iranian military assistance**, including the efforts to upgrade the terrorist organizations' rocket capabilities. Towards the end of the operation, **there was a change in the disclosure policy** of Iran and its most-affiliated terrorist organizations (the PIJ and Hezbollah). Those organizations launched a media campaign to publicize Iran's role in providing them with military aid (including weapons, funds and technological know-how). The campaign was joined by Hamas spokesmen, who alongside praise for Iran were careful to reiterate Hamas's independence and lack of dependence on Iran.

Remarks about Iranian Military Support

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

3. PIJ leader **Ramadan Shallah** was asked to comment on Khaled Mashaal's remark that there were differences of opinion between Hamas and Iran regarding the Syrian crisis. He replied that even if there were differences of opinion **they did not concern what was happening in Palestine** with the [so-called Israeli] "aggression" against Gaza. He added, **"On this issue we agree with Iran one hundred percent. Iran has given us all the support [we want]. The weapons used by the resistance – the whole world knows that they come mostly from Iran or purchased with Iranian funding."** Ramadan Shallah added that **the weapons were delivered to the Gaza**

Strip via Egypt, and that such shipments would continue in the future (Al-Jazeera, November 20, 2012).



PIJ head Ramadan Shallah: "...Iran has given us all the support [we want]. The weapons used by the resistance – the whole world knows that they come mostly from Iran... (Al-Jazeera, November 20, 2012).

4. **Ziad al-Nakhala**, deputy chairman of the PIJ, who participated in the Cairo negotiations, which led to a ceasefire in Operation Pillar of Defense, **praised Iran for the number of high quality weapons it provided to the "resistance"** [i.e., the terrorist organizations];

1) "We would like to thank our brothers in Iran for the great sacrifices they made to deliver this weapon to us [a reference to the long-range Fajr-5 rockets which can reach Tel Aviv] for the sake of defending the Palestinian people..." (Ziad al-Nakhala interviewed by the PIJ's Paltoday website, November 18, 2012)

2) Ziad al-Nakhala rejected the rumors that the escalation [between the Palestinians and Israel] was the implementation of an Iranian plan, saying "**...the weapons used by the resistance to fight, even Hamas' weapons, are Iranian from the first bullet to the [last] rocket, even what is produced locally is in fact [based on] Iranian [know-how]...**" (Al-Hayat, November 18, 2012).




Ziad al-Nakhala: The weapons used by the PIJ are Iranian (Al-Arabiya TV, November 20, 2012).

3) Asked by **Al-Alam**, the Iranian Arabic TV channel, about Fajr-5 rockets, he answered that **the rockets, which had brought victory [to the Palestinians], had been provided by Iran**. Asked if the Palestinians would stop smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip if a lull were agreed to, he answered vaguely that the PIJ was an independent body which armed itself to be able to defend its people (Al-Alam TV, November 19, 2012).

5. PIJ spokesman **Daoud Shihab** told the Lebanese channel Al-Mayadeen that "It is no secret that **we say that the military assistance provided to the Palestinian resistance, from A to Z, from bullet to rocket, is assistance from the Islamic Republic, Iranian assistance**. This is something we should say, and it is very appropriate for us to say so clearly and without being ashamed" (Al-Mayadeen, November 19).

6. After Operation Pillar of Defense, **posters thanking Iran were hung at the main intersections in Gaza City**. The objective was "to emphasize the important role played by Iran in the fighting **by giving the Palestinian resistance [i.e., terrorist organizations] military and financial support**." The posters were written in Arabic, Farsi, English and Hebrew on a background of rocket launchers illustrating the Iranian-manufactured Fajr-5 rockets. No notice was given of which group was responsible for hanging the posters. A broad hint to the identity of those responsible was given to Reuters in an interview with **Khader Habib**, a senior PIJ figure. He said it was "only natural" to thank Iran after the fighting, because **"Iranian rockets hit Tel Aviv and**

[even] reached Jerusalem. Thus it is our duty to thank those who helped our people" (Reuters, December 27, 2012).



Posters hung in the Gaza Strip, thanking Iran in four languages. The rocket launchers in the background symbolize Fajr-5 rockets (Qudsnet website, November 29, 2012).

7. Interviewed in Cairo, **Ramadan Shallah**, secretary general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, said that Iran was generous with the help it gave the Palestinian people. Iranian support, he said, was meant to reinforce the "firm stand" of the Palestinians, and **it was expressed in terms of financial aid and weapons**. He said all the countries in the Arab-Muslim world should follow Iran's example and support the Palestinians because Palestine was not only an Iranian issue but relevant to the entire Arab-Muslim world (Anadolu News Agency, Turkey, December 17, 2012).

Hezbollah

8. **Hassan Nasrallah**, speaking from his bunker in the southern Hezbollah-controlled suburb of Beirut, **praised the role of Iran and Syria** in providing the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip with weapons (Al-Manar TV, November 19, 2012):

- 1) He asked, rhetorically, how Fajr-5 rockets, Grad rockets and anti-tank missiles (Kornets and others) had reached the Gaza Strip. "Who sent them, despite the siege [on the Gaza Strip], and who delivered them?"

2) He answered that it was **important to emphasize the roles of Iran and Syria**. He spoke with contempt of the countries that sent medicines to the Palestinians [i.e., Egypt] or gave them "paltry sums of money" [i.e., Qatar]. He stressed the importance of [Iranian and Syrian] military aid, **which enabled the Palestinian organizations to attack Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, to open fire on planes and boats and to destroy armored personnel carriers**. On the other hand, he said, the Arab countries that sent boatloads of weapons to the Syrian opposition did not have the courage to send even one bullet to the Gaza Strip.

3) The real challenge for the Arab-Muslim world, said Nasrallah, **was for the Arab and Muslim countries to have the courage to send weapons to the Gaza Strip, starting today**. The Israelis, on the other hand, he said, were gambling that the Gazans would run out of rockets [implying that that should not happen].

4) Nasrallah related to the alleged claim that Iran had abandoned Hamas because Hamas had left the "camp of the resistance." He said that **Iran, Syria and Hezbollah** would not abandon the Gaza Strip [i.e., the terrorist organizations operating there] and would **continue to meet their obligations** to it, even if certain political disagreements existed [a reference to the dispute between Iran and Hamas regarding the Syrian regime].

9. In a speech given to students who were Hezbollah members or supporters, Nasrallah rejected the claim that the "resistance [i.e., Hamas] has returned to the Arab bosom and left the Iranian bosom." He emphasized that **for thirty years Iran had provided the "Palestinian resistance"** [i.e., Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations] **with unconditional support** and without expecting to be thanked for it. He added, with implied criticism, **that if the Arab states had provided the Gaza Strip with financial aid, weapons (including missiles) and training, they would have been blessed, because they would have saved Iran both money and arms**. All Iran wanted, he said, was for "Palestine to be strong and for the Palestinian people to be able to defend themselves and restore their lands..." (Radio Nur, December 16, 2012).

10. **Ibrahim al-Amin**, an important Lebanese political commentator close to Hezbollah and frequently interviewed by Al-Manar TV, published an article **criticizing Hamas for not giving Iran and Syria credit for the military aid they had provided**. The article noted that **the damaged military infrastructure needed to be rebuilt** [implying, with the assistance of Iran and Syria]. The following are the main points of the article,

published in the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar (Al-Akhbar, November 20, 2012):

1) The article is entitled "What strategy will the resistance adopt after the victory?" and begins by asking **why Khaled Mashaal did not thank Syria, Iran and Hezbollah for the direct military assistance they provided to the "resistance forces" in the Gaza Strip.** Mashaal did, on the other hand, shower praise – more than once – on Egypt, Turkey and Qatar for standing by the people of the Gaza Strip.

2) The article argues that **Khaled Mashaal did not fulfill his duty toward Iran and Syria, which had invested huge efforts, spent tens of millions of dollars and sacrificed people to develop the military capabilities of the "resistance forces"** [i.e., the terrorist organizations] **in the Gaza Strip,** mainly their artillery capabilities. There were no particular interests involved in providing the assistance. Instead, what motivated Iran was the **sense of a "sacred mission," of ideology and devotion to Allah.**

3) The ceasefire between Israel ("the enemy") and the terrorists ("the resistance"), which will be reached soon **must not lead to moves that are not grounded in "the core of resistance" and do not reflect its objectives.** Accordingly, those who believe they support "the resistance" (i.e., Egypt and its allies) **need to provide it with practical support.** That is because there is an ongoing campaign being waged between "the resistance" and "the occupation," in which **"armed resistance is a real and permanent option."**

4) The terrorist organizations ("the resistance") have demonstrated that their artillery can hit sensitive centers in the very heart of Israel ("the heart of the enemy"). That means that artillery played a crucial part in halting the Israeli aggression, which leads to the question of **what the "resistance forces"** (i.e., terrorist organizations) **will do next.** Will they agree to a sustained ceasefire (*hudna*) for "governmental profits" and settle with the rehabilitation of their [civilian] infrastructure, or will they benefit from their experience to rebuild **a high-quality military and artillery force** that can deter Israel from repeating its aggression (an alternative which Ibrahim al-Amin implies he supports).

Hamas

11. Senior Hamas officials (after a certain delay) joined the campaign praising Iran's military aid. **Ali Barake**, Hamas representative in Lebanon, said in an interview that **Iran was the principal military and financial supporter** of most of the Palestinian [terrorist] organizations in the Gaza Strip, and **did not**, he said, **demand anything in return or impose conditions**. He stressed that the ties between Hamas and Iran were strategic and continued even after Hamas had announced its position on Syria. He added that during Operation Pillar of Defense a senior Iranian had contacted him every day for updates. The senior Iranian has said Iran was ready to provide material and military support during the operation, in the name of its "ideological and moral commitment." **As for the medium-range M75 rockets fired during Operation Pillar of Defense, said Barake, they were the local version of the Fajr-5, whose technology had come from Iran** (NTV, November 25, 2012).

12. **Mahmoud al-Zahar** praised Iran for its military and financial support of the terrorist organizations, while stressing Hamas' independence.

1) He said that he did not deny that Iran had given them **weapons and money**. He said that the money had been invested in **developing missiles** which had a longer range than those received from Iran. He said Iran had never asked anything of Hamas and that was why Hamas was willing to accept aid from it (Al-Aqsa TV, November 22, 2012).

2) Speaking before Hamas terrorist operatives he admitted that **some of the rockets had been manufactured in Iran** and that Iran supported Hamas **with weapons and money**. He added that **Iran had never asked for anything in return** but only that the rockets be used to "liberate Palestine" (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, November 24, 2012).

Praise for Iranian military support in the Iranian media

13. The Iranian media, quoting senior regime figures, also praised Iran's military support for the Palestinians, stressing the Fajr-5 rocket fire into Israel during Operation Pillar of Defense. As was the case with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, the Iranian media used Iran's military support for the Palestinians as an argument against other Islamic countries (hinting at Egypt and its allies) that did not provide the Palestinians with the arms it wanted. However, the Iranian media also had criticism for Iran's admission of providing the Palestinians with rockets, among other reasons, **because of concern over Western legal action against Iran**. For example:

1) Speaking before the parliament on November 21, **Ali Larijani** said, "I am proud to announce that **our support for the Palestinians was in money and arms**. We are proud to announce that we will continue standing by the Palestinians in the most difficult of situations" (Fars News, November 21, 2012).

2) Deputy parliament speaker Mohammad Hassan **Abu Torabi Fard** spoke to the parliament about the role of the Iranian armed forces in building the military capabilities of the Palestinian fighters in Gaza. He said, "**The ability of Iran's armed forces was demonstrated in Gaza and resulted in the humiliation and helplessness of the Zionist regime**" (Fars News, November 18, 2012).

3) The Iranian establishment TV channels praised the "Iranian rockets that hit the territories of the Zionist enemies."

4) The daily newspaper **Kayhan** said that while **Hamas was firing Iranian missiles at Israel** and the leaders of Arab countries remained silent, Hamas fighters and hundreds of millions of Muslim observers in the region now knew better than ever that **Iran was the one supporting the Palestinian people** and that it placed no significance whatsoever on differences between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims (Kayhan, November 17, 2012).

5) On November 21, 2012, the **Fars News Agency** published an article about the strategic change caused by Iran's massive investment in the missile industry. The article said that to a great extent the missile systems could determine the outcome in an asymmetrical war, **which was why Iran's investment had not been in vain** (a reference to to Iran's "investment" in supplying rockets to the Palestinian terrorist organizations).

14. The following is a quote from the Iranian website Tabnak, affiliated with **Mohsen Rezaee**, currently the secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

"If not for Iran's financial and military support of Hamas, the results of the current confrontation would have been completely different. The Iranian missiles launched into Israeli were the main cause of the Israelis' fear and the ceasefire forced on Israel. What, on the other hand, did Hamas' Arab and Turkish friends do?"

"Egypt, in fact, undertook diplomatic activity which led to the ceasefire. However, without the military support provided by Iran to the Palestinian resistance [i.e., terrorist organizations], the fighting would not have ended with a ceasefire favoring the Palestinians."

Reservations and denial

15. **The Asr-e Iran website** criticized reports appearing in the Iranian media according to which the missiles used by Hamas were made in Iran. The website said that by making that claim, Iran was detracting from the heroism of the "Palestinian resistance fighters" and crediting itself with the struggle against Israel. **In addition, such claims could have negative political and legal consequences, given the large number of lawsuits filed against Iran in Western courts by victims of terrorist attacks in Palestine [from] Lebanon.** According to the website, the lawsuits were based on the claim that Iran had relations with Hezbollah and Hamas, and provided them with weapons. Even if Iran did provide Hamas with Fajr-5 missiles, **making such claims was inappropriate under the current circumstances and at a time when the Iranian regime itself denied it** (Asr-e Iran, November 19, 2012).

16. Several top Iranian figures even denied the fact that the rockets that were launched from the Gaza Strip were Iranian:

1) Revolutionary Guards Commander **Mohammad Ali Jafari** was asked whether the rockets launched by Hamas were Iranian. He answered that Iran put its experience at the disposal of all Muslims, including Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. He added that Gaza was under siege and therefore Iran could not supply the Palestinians with Fajr-5 rockets. He also said that **Iran had in fact provided [the Palestinian terrorist organizations] with the technological know-how that enabled them to manufacture Fajr-5 rockets, and they were now manufacturing them without delay** (ISNA, November 21, 2012).

2) **Alaeddin Boroujerdi**, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian Parliament, argued that contrary to what Israel said, Iran did not equip the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip with rockets capable of hitting Tel Aviv (Akhbarak website, November 18, 2012).

Appendix B

Iranian military aid to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip between Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense

Upgrading the rocket arsenal

1. Iranian military aid for the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip delivered by the Qods Force **was manifested primarily by the provision of advanced weapons**. The weapons included **Fajr-5 medium-range rockets, with a range of 75 kilometers, or 46.6 miles**, some of which were fired during Operation Pillar of Defense **(most of which were destroyed by the IDF on the first day of the operation)**.
2. In addition, the Iranians supplied the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip with **122mm Grad rockets with ranges of 20-40 kilometers (12.4-24.8 miles), among them 122mm rockets with ranges of 20 kilometers (which could be separated into four sections to make it easier to smuggle them in through the tunnels); various types of mortars (60mm, 81mm and 120 mm); anti-tank missiles (including Sagger, Fagot, Konkurs and Kornet missiles); anti-tank rockets (PG-7 and PG-29); shoulder-fired missiles; and the technological know-how to manufacture weapons by themselves, especially medium-range artillery rockets and advanced IEDs**.
3. With Iranian military and financial support, the terrorist organizations, especially Hamas and the PIJ, **increased the number of rockets and upgraded them throughout the four years between Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense. The upgrading was expressed by extending the rockets' ranges, enlarging their warheads and increasing their precision**. On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense Hamas, the PIJ and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip had **many thousands of rockets of various ranges**, both standard and locally manufactured, enabling them to **fire continuous massive barrages of rockets at population centers in southern and central Israel** throughout the eight days of the operation.



Hamas terrorist operatives display 122mm (Grad) rocket launchers dug into the sand (Al-Jazeera, February 28, 2009).




Hamas terrorist operatives display a PG-29 launcher and rocket (Al-Jazeera, February 28, 2009).

Other types of support

4. In addition, the Iranians, led by the Qods Force, provided additional military aid:

- 1) **Smuggling weapons to the Gaza Strip overland and by sea:** Iran was the source of most of the high-quality weapons smuggled into the Gaza Strip. For that purpose, Iran set up **an extensive, border-crossing smuggling network** that included overland and sea routes. **The key country was Sudan**, through

which weapons from Iran were delivered to the Gaza Strip by professional criminal smuggling rings motivated by profit (See Appendix D).




Vehicles carrying weapons allegedly hit by Israel in Sudan (Al-Jazeera, March 26, 2009).

2) **Assisting in the local development and production of weapons:** Iran provided technological know-how used, among other purposes, to manufacture medium-range rockets and advanced IEDs (like those used against the IDF in Lebanon and against American soldiers in Iraq). During Operation Pillar of Defense M75 rockets manufactured in the Gaza Strip were fired at the center of Israel. **A Hamas spokesman said that they manufactured them with technological know-how received from Iran.**

3) **Training terrorist operatives in Iran:** Hamas and PIJ operatives were trained in Iran by the Qods Force to improve their fighting skills regarding rocket fire, the use of IEDs, sniper fire and various other fighting tactics (See below).

4) **Funding:** Iran transferred funds to finance Hamas and PIJ military activities. Apparently the political dispute between Hamas and Iran, caused by the crisis in Syria, put an end to Iran's direct financial support, leaving only military aid. **In our assessment, the PIJ continues relying on financial support from Iran.**



The ranges of rockets attacking the Israeli civilian population during Operation Pillar of Defense. Most of the rockets and mortar shells were either smuggled into the Gaza Strip by Iran or manufactured locally with Iranian technology.

Legend

Red **Various types of mortars** (60mm, 81mm, 120mm and improvised mortars); ranges of 3-10 kilometers (1.86-6.2 miles)

Blue **Improvised rockets** (90mm, 115mm, 168mm); **ranges** of 6-20 kilometers (3.72-12.4 miles); **warheads weighing** 5-15 kilograms (11-33 lbs). **122mm rockets** with **ranges** of 21 kilometers (13 miles) and **warheads weighing** 5-15 kilograms (11-33 lbs).

Green **Standard 122 rockets** (made in Russia, China and Iran) with **ranges** of 40 kilometers (24.8 miles)

Purple **Iranian Fajr-5 rockets** with **ranges** of 75 kilometers (46.6 miles). The Fajr-5 **weighs** 900 kilograms (1980 lbs) of which 170 kilograms (374 lbs) belong to the warhead, whose **explosive charge weighs** 90 kilograms (198 lbs). **M75** locally manufactured 8" rockets with **ranges** of 75 kilometers (46.6 miles)

Courses and training

5. After Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, and as part of the process of accelerating the construction of its military force, **Hamas and PIJ terrorist operatives were sent to Iran for courses and training.** At the end of their training they were infiltrated back into the Gaza Strip to pass the information and skills they had acquired to other terrorist operatives.

6. **Hamas' program of training in Iran was made public in a rare 2008 exposé** in the British **Sunday Times** by Marie Colvin, who interviewed an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades terrorist operative who remained anonymous (although his physical description did appear). He spoke about **the training hundreds of Hamas terrorist operatives had received in Iran.**

1) **Hundreds of Hamas terrorist operatives trained in Iran:** The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards [in our assessment, the Qods Force] had been training them in Tehran, according to the interview, since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 (i.e., since the disengagement). At the time of the interview 150 had finished their training. An additional 150 were currently in Iran, improving their fighting skills. Some would return as fighters and others, who were not fit to fight, would join Hamas' "research unit."

2) **The route to Iran:** Hamas operatives **leave the Gaza Strip for Egypt and from there fly to Syria and from there to Tehran.** Entering and leaving Tehran they are permitted not to have their passports stamped for security reasons.⁴

3) **Length and location of training:** Hamas operatives train for periods lasting from 45 days to six months. The training takes place at a closed military base under difficult conditions and is supervised by members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. The operatives are allowed off base only once a week, and then only in a group and accompanied by Iranian security personnel.


4) **Training topics:** Hamas operatives undergo training in **tactical warfare and weapons operation**, and return to the Gaza Strip with the skills they acquired in

⁴ The same was true for Hezbollah terrorist operatives who went to Iran for training. For example, **Hussein Ali Suleiman**, a Hezbollah terrorist operative who has taken captive during the Second Lebanon War, said during interrogation that he had trained in Iran along with 40-50 other Hezbollah operatives from Lebanon. He said that the operatives in the group did not have their passports stamped in Syria or Iran so that they could **hide the fact they had left Lebanon for training in Iran.**

advanced technology, **rocket launching, detonating IEDs**, sniping and other tactics similar to those used by Hezbollah.

5) **At the time the article was written, in March 2008, seven groups of Hamas operatives had been sent to Iran.** The best students in each group remained in Iran for longer periods, participated in advanced courses and returned to the Gaza Strip to serve as **instructors**. It can be assumed that in the four years since the article was published, additional groups of terrorist operatives have been sent to Iran for training.

7. The relative quiet in the Gaza Strip since Operation Cast Lead made it possible for Hamas and the PIJ **to hold extensive training activities** in the Gaza Strip and beyond its borders as well with **Iranian support**. The training emphasized providing military capabilities and specific training in using advanced weapons, such as rocket and mortar shell systems, anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft weapons.



Pictures taken by a correspondent for the Iranian TV channel Al-Alam, who accompanied the PIJ training (Al-Alam TV, February 1, 2009).

Appendix C

Examples of Weapons and Technological Know-How Originating in Iran

Standard weapons

1. The following are some of advanced weapons provided by Iran to the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip:

1) **Fajr-5 rocket** (“Fajr” is Farsi for “dawn”): A medium range artillery rocket manufactured in Iran since 1991, apparently with North Korean assistance. **With a range of approximately 75 km (46.6 miles)**, it is capable of reaching **Israel’s center (including the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem regions)**. Its warhead weighs 170 kilograms (385 lbs), of which **90 kilograms (198 lbs) are explosives**. Launching rockets at Israel’s center during Operation Pillar of Defense has become an important component in the “victory myth” perpetuated by Hamas and the PIJ.



Fajr-5

Turning the Fajr-5 into a symbol in the battle for hearts and minds



Two terrorist operatives carry a Fajr rocket (From the website of the PIJ's Jerusalem Brigades)

"The Fajr will create victories" (From the website of the PIJ's Jerusalem Brigades)




Left: Fajr-5 rocket launched during a military exercise in Iran (ISNA, November 13, 2012). Right: Fajr-5 launchers hit by the Israeli Air Force during Operation Pillar of Defense (IDF Spokesman, November 17, 2012)

2) 122mm Grad rockets for ranges of up to 20 km (12.4 miles) and 40 km (24.8 miles):

A. In recent years Iran has provided Hamas and the PIJ with 122mm rockets having ranges of up to 40 km (24.8 miles). Fired at Israel during Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense, they placed more


cities deep inside Israeli territory – including Ashdod and Beersheba – within range of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. Earlier, Hamas and the PIJ had received 122mm Grad rockets capable of reaching Ashqelon (20 km, or 12.4 miles).

B. To facilitate the concealing and smuggling of 122mm rockets into the Gaza Strip, **the Iranians constructed standard rockets with motors composed of four sections.** Such a development could only be possible in a country with an advanced military industry, like Iran. The remains of a rocket fuse, found in Ashqelon in early 2008, was another sign that it had been manufactured in Iran.



Hamas operatives deploying 40-km 122mm rockets (YouTube, December 13, 2012)⁵

⁵ While the video states that the rocket is an M75, based on the footage we believe it is a 122mm Grad rocket with a range of up to 40 km.



122mm Grad rocket with a range of up to 40 km



The remains of a 20-km 122mm Grad rocket designed in Iran for smuggling into the Gaza Strip (based on an analysis of the Grad rocket remains found in Ashqelon in early 2008)


3) Kornet anti-tank missile (AT-14):

A. An advanced Russian-made laser-guided anti-tank system designed to destroy armored vehicles. Its warhead is capable of penetrating reactive armor. The Kornet was used by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War. In December 2010, former Israeli Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazy revealed that a Kornet missile had been fired at an IDF Merkava tank from the Gaza Strip.

B. On April 7, 2011, Hamas fired a Kornet missile at a school bus in the western Negev. The bus was only 2 km (1.25 miles) away from the security fence. The terrorists who fired the missile must have known that their target was a school bus due to its distinctive yellow color. One boy was killed and two people (the driver and another boy) were injured.



Kornet anti-tank missile



A Kornet anti-tank missile displayed at an exhibition of weapons (or models of weapons) used by the PIJ during Operation Pillar of Defense (Jerusalem Brigades website, December 26, 2012)



The school bus hit by a Kornet missile fired by a Hamas terrorist squad (Photo by Shalom Gaziel for Reuters, April 7, 2011)

4) **Konkurs anti-tank missile (AT-5):** A Russian second-generation anti-tank guided system. Iran manufactures a replica called **Tusan**. Its maximum range is 4 km (2.5 miles), its penetration is 650 mm (25.6 inches), and its warhead weighs 3.5 kilograms (7.7 lbs).




Konkurs anti-tank missile


5) C-704 anti-ship missiles manufactured in Iran:

A. On March 15, 2011, an Israeli navy force intercepted the cargo ship *Victoria*. The ship was sailing from the Syrian port of Latakia to the Egyptian port of Alexandria. It was carrying an estimated 50 tons of weapons destined for the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The weapons were in three containers, concealed behind bales of cotton and sacks of lentils (See Appendix D for details).


B. **The weapons found aboard the ship included six C-704 anti-ship missiles manufactured in Iran.** There were also **two naval radars, operating stations for the missiles and instruction manuals in Farsi.** The covers of the manuals featured **the emblems of Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.**

C. In the hands of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, the missiles **would have endangered Israeli naval and civilian vessels as well as Israeli strategic targets in the Ashdod and Ashqelon area (up to 35 km, or 21.7 miles, from the Gaza Strip).**





C-704 anti-ship missiles found aboard the Victoria (IDF Spokesman, March 16, 2011)



Radar monitoring and control stations for the anti-ship missiles seized aboard the Victoria (IDF Spokesman, March 16, 2011).

6) **Shoulder-fired missiles:** The Iranians provided the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip with shoulder-fired missiles (man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADs) manufactured in Iran, **replicas of the Russian SA-7**. A number of them were fired at IDF aircraft during Operation Pillar of Defense.



Shoulder-fired missile systems (MANPADs)

Transmitting technological know-how

2. The following are weapons manufactured by the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip based on Iranian technological know-how:


1) **Hamas IEDs (particularly explosively-formed projectiles, EFPs) called Shawaz** (Arabic for “flame”): Exposed by the IDF on September 12, 2006, during operational activity in the Gaza Strip, they have higher penetration capabilities (estimated at over 200 mm, or 8 inches, of steel) than those used by other Palestinian terrorist organizations. That is the result of **higher production quality and the use of higher-energy explosives based on technological know-how transmitted by Iran and/or Hezbollah**. The quality of the explosive charges used by the terrorist organizations **continues to rise**.



Shawaz, Hamas-manufactured EFP

2) **Hamas locally-manufactured medium-range M75 rockets:**⁶ With a range of up to 75 km (46.6 miles), they were first fired at Israel's center during Operation Pillar of Defense. Like the Fajr-5, they have also become an important component of Hamas' "victory narrative."


The use of M75 rockets for propaganda



An exhibition organized by Hamas at Beir Zeit University (near Ramallah) featured models of medium-range M75 rockets used in Operation Pillar of Defense (Filastin Al-'An, December 5, 2012).

⁶ The 75 refers to the rocket's range, while the M stands for **Ibrahim Maqadma**, one of the leaders of the Hamas' military-terrorist wing, who was killed by the IDF in 2003.

3) **Manufacturing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs):** IDF activity in the Gaza Strip uncovered an attempt by Hamas to manufacture a network of UAVs planned for use against Israel. The network was attacked and destroyed by IAF aircraft (IDF Spokesman, November 17, 2012).




Video taken by the IAF shows a Hamas UAV in a training flight in Khan Yunis (IDF Spokesman, November 17, 2012)

Appendix D

Weapons Smuggling Network from Iran to the Gaza Strip


Overview

1. Iran's massive military assistance to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, aimed at restoring and increasing their military power after Operation Cast Lead, required smuggling a large quantity of weapons. To that end Iran created an extensive smuggling network using overland, air and sea routes. The arms originated in Iran and were smuggled to Sudan by sea and air. Once there, they were transported to the Gaza Strip through Egypt, using the extensive network of tunnels dug under the Egypt-Gaza Strip border. The Sudan-Gaza Strip smuggling network employs smuggling gangs whose primary motive is profit.




Map of the weapons smuggling routes from Iran to the Gaza Strip

2. After Operation Cast Lead, Hamas improved and institutionalized its network of smuggling tunnels to accommodate large quantities of weapons. In addition, terrorist operatives were infiltrated into and from the Gaza Strip, including some who had been denied entry into the Gaza Strip by the Egyptian security services. The weapons smuggled by the Iranians into the Gaza Strip included advanced weapons including standard, longer-range rockets (Fajr-5), anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft systems. Also smuggled into the Gaza Strip were small arms, explosives, mortar shells and raw materials for the manufacture of homemade weapons.



Activity in the tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Hamás' PALDF forum, January 24, 2009)



Renewal of smuggling through the tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Al-Arabiya TV, February 1, 2009)

3. In addition to Sudan, **Iran also uses the sea** to smuggle weapons to the terrorist organizations. One example was the attempt to smuggle weapons aboard the *Victoria*, whose cargo included six advanced C-704 anti-ship missiles manufactured in Iran. They were shipped **from the Syrian port of Latakia** and were supposed to arrive at the **Egyptian port of Alexandria** (See below).

Smuggling weapons to the Gaza Strip via Sudan

Overview


4. **The Qods Force uses Sudan, with which the Iranian regime has close relations, as a main transit country** for delivering weapons to the Gaza Strip. The weapons that originate in Iran are sent to Sudan **by air and sea** (from Iranian ports, through the Persian Gulf, to Port Sudan).

Shipments of Weapons from Iran to Sudan

5. The following are examples of Iranian weapon shipments to Sudan, destined for the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip:

1) In March **2009** the **American and Arab media reported that Israel had attacked an arms convoy in Sudan on its way to the Gaza Strip:**

A. On **March 25** CBS reported that in January 2009 Israeli planes had attacked **an arms convoy of an estimated 20 trucks** in Sudan, on its way to the Gaza Strip. According to the report, the attack was carried out in the desert southwest of Port Sudan, and 39 men were killed.



Pictures broadcast by Al-Jazeera TV, allegedly photographed at the site of the attack in Sudan (Al-Jazeera TV, March 26, 2009)

B. According to the March 29 issue of Time Magazine, the arms shipment had left Iran and was sponsored by the Imam Khomeini Foundation. **It included long-range Fajr missiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv.**

C. On March 30 Time Magazine reported that **the convoy, composed of 23 trucks, was attacked by dozens of fighter planes and UAVs.** According to the report, when photographs taken by drones revealed that it had been only partially destroyed, the planes returned and attacked again.

2) In **2009** Iran apparently used **cargo flights of the Sudanese Bader Airlines** to ship weapons to the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The cargos were shipped **from Iran to Sudan via Oman and Saudi Arabia, and from Sudan to Syria through Egypt and Jordan** (Wikileaks, March 29, 2009). According to Wikileaks, the United States warned Sudan, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen that transporting Iranian weapons through Sudan for the Palestinian terrorist organizations was a serious breach of the UN resolution forbidding Iran to ship weapons of any type.

3) In **August 2010** five containers of weapons were delivered from Iran to Sudan. They contained at least several Fajr rockets and were destined for Hamas and the PIJ.

4) In **August-September 2012** weapons were delivered from Iran to Sudan on **cargo flights.**

Explosion at the Yarmouk facility

6. On October 23, 2012 **an explosion occurred at the Yarmouk facility in Khartoum, Sudan.** According to media reports, the facility was owned by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards and served as a factory for manufacturing weapons destined for the Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip.



The site of the explosion (Iran's Al-Alam Arabic-language TV channel)



Before and after photographs of the explosion site taken by the American-based Satellite Sentinel Project and published in the Arab media (Alhayat.com, October 29, 2012). According to the Satellite Sentinel Project (quoted by the Israeli daily Yedioth Aharonoth, October 28, 2012), the before photograph, taken on October 12, shows a shed with an estimated 40 adjacent containers, each 6.5 meters, or about 7 yards, long. The after photograph, taken on October 25, shows that the building and the containers were completely destroyed. "If the explosions resulted from a rocket or missile attack against material stored in the shipping containers, then it was an effective surgical strike that totally destroyed any container that may have remained and the adjacent 60-meter-long, shed-style building," said the Satellite Sentinel Project's report.

Hezbollah's involvement in smuggling weapons from Sudan

7. Hezbollah, which sometimes serves Iran as a subcontractor for military assistance to the Palestinians, **also participated in the Sudan-Gaza Strip smuggling network.** That was revealed by the testimony of **Sami Shihab**, a Hezbollah operative sent from Lebanon to Egypt and head of a Hezbollah cell exposed by the Egyptian security services in late 2008.

8. Sami Shihab revealed that his direct commander was **Mohammad Qabalan**, a senior Hezbollah operative from Lebanon, who had been in Egypt during 2007 and 2008. **Mohammad Qabalan was involved in infiltrating operatives and smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip** for terrorist attacks against Israel. As part of the preparations for smuggling weapons, **Mohammad Qabalan went to Sudan "to meet with African and Sudanese smugglers."** During his stay in Sudan, it was agreed that the smugglers would receive \$2,000 for each person infiltrated into the Gaza Strip and \$16,000 for a passenger car.

The naval route: The case of Victoria


Overview

9. On the morning of **March 15, 2011**, 200 miles west of Israel's coast, an IDF navy force inspected the **cargo ship Victoria. The ship was en route from the Syrian port of Latakia to the Turkish port of Mersin, and from there would continue to the Egyptian port of Alexandria.** When the ship was found to be carrying weapons, it was led to the port of Ashdod, where the weapons were unloaded. It was then released and apparently continued to Alexandria.



Left: The Victoria led to the port of Ashdod (IDF Spokesman's website, March 15, 2011) Right: The Victoria

10. The *Victoria* was carrying containers found to be holding an estimated 50 tons of weapons destined for the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The weapons were in three containers, concealed behind bales of cotton and sacks of lentils. There were 60mm and 120mm mortar shells, C-704 anti-ship missiles and ammunition for Kalashnikov assault rifles.




Missile stamped "NASR-1," the Iranian name for the C-704

12. The timing of the *Victoria* smuggling attempt coincided with the internal uprisings in the Arab countries, **including Egypt**, which is an important route for smuggling arms into the Gaza Strip. In our assessment Iran and Syria were exploiting the upheaval in Egypt to **increase their efforts to arm the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip. The announcement issued by Egypt on March 13, 2011, of the capture of five vehicles carrying weapons from Sudan** apparently destined for the Gaza Strip, **may have been an indication of another Iranian-Syrian effort.** Shipping weapons aboard the *Victoria* was a gross violation of **UN Security Council** resolutions. It was also a violation of **civilian naval security and transportation regulations** governing the shipping of dangerous goods.




Display at the port of Ashdod of the weapons found aboard the *Victoria* (IDF Spokesman, March 16, 2011)

11. **Most of the weapons, including the C-704 missiles, were manufactured in Iran** (the Iranian version of the missile is called **NASR-1**). It was the first time **anti-ship missiles destined for the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip had been seized.** They would have **endangered Israeli military and civilian vessels as well as Israeli strategic targets in the Ashdod-Ashqelon region at a range of 35 kilometers (20 nautical miles).**



Weapons hidden behind bales of cotton and sacks of lentils



Radar systems

Weapons found aboard the *Victoria*

13. The three containers found aboard the *Victoria* held an estimated **fifty tons of weapons**:

- 1) **Six C-704 anti-ship missiles manufactured in Iran, two naval radars and operating stations for the anti-ship missiles.**




The emblem of Iran



The emblem of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards


Farsi instruction manual for the C-704 anti-ship missiles, found aboard the Victoria.


- 2) **230 120mm mortar shells manufactured in Iran** accompanied by a range table.
- 3) **2,270 M-61 60mm mortar shells** accompanied by a range table. According to the table, the type of fuse used by the mortars was the AZ111-A2, developed and **manufactured by Iran.**



Mortar shells 60 mm

4) **66,960 7.62-caliber bullets for Kalashnikov assault rifles.**





Weapons found aboard the ship (IDF Spokesman, March 16, 2011). Lower left: Iranian defense minister Vahidi reviewing C-704 anti-ship missiles at the factory in Iran (Fars News Agency, Iran, March 7, 2010)

Anti-ship missiles found aboard the Victoria

14. Prominent among the weapons were **six C-704 anti-ship missiles**, manufactured in Iran using Chinese technology. **The missiles were stamped "NASR-1," their Iranian name.** They use a **radar homing system and have a range of 35 kilometers (20 nautical miles).** The missiles are light and easy to operate. Their possession by the **terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip would have endangered Israeli naval and civilian vessels, as well as ships arriving at the port of Ashdod and strategic targets in the area.**

15. The missiles were accompanied by **instruction manuals written in Farsi.** The **emblems of Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards** appeared on the front cover. According to the range cards found aboard the ship, the fuses for the 60mm mortar shells were AZ111-A2, developed in accordance with the requirements of the Iranian army and manufactured in Iran (Jane's Ammunition Handbook). The missiles were accompanied by accessories such as traverse, elevation, monitoring and control systems.

Technical specifications of the C-704 anti-ship missile

Guidance system: "Fire and forget" radar navigation

Country of manufacture: China/Iran

Range: 35 kilometers (20 nautical miles)

Overall weight: 360 kilograms, or 794 lbs

Warhead weight: 128 kilograms, or 282 lbs

Velocity: 0.8 Mach



C-704 anti-ship missile (Fresh.co.il website, March 16, 2011)



Anti-ship missiles found aboard the Victoria (IDF Spokesman, March 16, 2011)



Radar monitoring and control stations seized aboard the ship (IDF Spokesman, March 16, 2011)