

Islamic Republic of

I R A N

Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Statement by

Ambassador Mehdi Danesh-Yazdi

Deputy Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Before the United Nations Disarmament Commission

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In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, I wish to congratulate you on the assumption of the chairmanship of the present session of the Disarmament Commission--an important body which is dear to the large members of this august Organization. I am sure that under your skillful stewardship, we will be able to have a smooth and successful meeting. I would also like to welcome the newly appointed Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Nobuaki Tanaka and wish him success. My delegation will not hesitate to continue its cooperation with the Department of Disarmament Affairs during Mr. Tanaka's tenure.

May I associate my delegation with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

After two years of deadlock over the agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), we are glad that this year the Commission has a substantive agenda, including one item on nuclear disarmament which should be considered for three years. This provides us with a very good opportunity to express our views on the noble goal of nuclear disarmament which, for more than three decades, the international community awaits its realization. It also offers us a chance to review the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and to work on "recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" in all its aspects.

Mr. Chairman,

The continued existences of thousands of nuclear warheads in the nuclear-weapon States' stockpiles, which can destroy the entire globe many times over, and increasingly resorting to

threat for their possible use are the major sources of concerns to the global peace and security. The international community has the right to be assured that the nightmare that visited upon the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never happen again. Regrettably, the limited efforts of the major nuclear-weapon States after the Cold War to reduce their arsenals have faced serious setbacks, particularly in recent years. Nuclear weapons continue to be deployed in non-nuclear-weapon countries as a part of the coalition of certain group of states; a fact that exacerbates the already tense situation. Furthermore, concerns remain over the research and development of new non-strategic and low-yield easy-to-use nuclear weapons coupled with the daily threat of their probable use against non-nuclear-weapon States even in conventional combat.

Unfortunately, a serious attempt has been made to undermine the obligations agreed by consensus in the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. Non-nuclear weapon States, despite the difficulties that the non-proliferation regime had historically faced, generally assessed that the NPT has been successful in containing the number of nuclear-weapon States and therefore in 1995 agreed on a package of decisions to allow the indefinite extension of the NPT.

The consensual Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference reconfirmed these obligations and agreed on a plan of action in the form of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement nuclear disarmament. As a follow-up to the 1995 Middle East Resolution, NPT States Parties decided to call upon Israel by name to accede to the NPT and to place all its clandestine nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in realizing the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East. Furthermore, the 2000 NPT Conference, while reaffirming that IAEA has to be the sole competent authority responsible for assuring the peaceful application of nuclear energy, reconfirmed the undertakings by all parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States Parties.

After the 2000 NPT Review Conference, however, a trend of denials has been added to the previously rejection of inalienable rights of the States Parties to the peaceful nuclear energy. Certain nuclear-weapon State first rejected "the unequivocal undertakings by the Nuclear-Weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament," and later on, even claimed that "obligations under Article VI do not exist" at all.

As a result of such policy, the 2005 NPT Review Conference ended without any substantive outcome and soon after that, the UN World Summit failed to include a section on disarmament due to the rejection of having any reference to nuclear disarmament.

The UN General Assembly in its resolution 60/72, which was tabled by the Islamic Republic of Iran, expressed its grave concern over the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and urged the States Parties to the NPT to follow up on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

Mr. Chairman,

Adoption of the agenda items for the 2006 substantive session of UNDC, including one on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has created a good opportunity to revive the nuclear disarmament process. The UN Disarmament Commission, as a specialized and deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery, should have an in-depth discussion on the most important and urgent issue in the field of disarmament, namely nuclear disarmament. In our view, the Commission can make concrete recommendations, if a political will exists, for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects.

In consideration of the nuclear disarmament issue, the priority should be given to the security assurances. Non-nuclear-weapon States, in the last decades, have been under threat of the high risk of possible use of nuclear weapons. The lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, coupled with the recent stated positions to possibly use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, has created a fragile international environment where national security of non-nuclear-weapon States are in deep jeopardy. All promises given by nuclear-weapon States about their readiness to negotiate on a legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat to use or use of nuclear weapons, have turned out to be empty undertakings thus contributing to mistrust among members of the international community.

We are of the firm belief that at this stage, along with our effort towards exploring ways and means to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, simultaneous efforts should be made to conclude a legally binding instrument against the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Commission is the appropriate forum to take up this issue and make specific recommendations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing. Iran as the initiator of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East fully supports the genuine efforts aimed at curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Iran was among the first countries that ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and concluded the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, therefore, put its facilities under supervision of the Agency. The accession of Iran to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and signing the Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are indicative of our resolve to adhere to the objective of non-proliferation. We are of the view that the best way of assuring the non-proliferation of WMD is the full and non-selective implementation of those treaties, and transparency measures provided by these instruments as well as promoting their universality. Double-standard approach, rewarding non-parties and setting arbitrary thresholds would only undermine the credibility of the disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.

In our view, the efforts directed towards non-proliferation should be paralleled by simultaneous efforts aimed at disarmament. The strengthening of these two concepts together would serve well in securing a world that is free from weapons of mass destruction. Attaining the universality of non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, in particular the NPT is a must for the international community to be safe and secure.

Furthermore, the integrity and durability of international regime such as the NPT is solely dependant on the full and non-discriminatory implementation of all its provisions. As a Non-Aligned Movement member State, we share the view "that the NPT is a key instrument for halting vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and as the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament". Non-nuclear-weapon States renounced the nuclear option and fulfilled their commitments provided that they will be able to exercise their inalienable rights to peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination or arbitrary thresholds.

Nuclear-weapon States are also bound by certain obligations under different provisions of the Treaty, including:

- Article IV for facilitating not to restrict the peaceful application of nuclear technology,
- Article VI on nuclear disarmament,
- Article III.2 on refraining from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty,
- Article I on avoidance of transferring to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or controlling over such weapons.

The importance of these obligations requires the Commission to reflect them in all its recommendations.

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to emphasize that our commitment to the NPT is unqualified. Iran renounced the nuclear weapons not only because of its contractual obligations under the NPT, but due to its historical backgrounds and religious edicts. As a State Party to the NPT, Iran insists on its inalienable rights to peaceful nuclear technology and will not accept any arbitrary threshold while it has gone out of its way to address any genuine concern about the exclusively peaceful nature of its program.

I should not conclude this statement without assuring you of our continued full commitment to NPT provisions and cooperation with the IAEA. We are also willingly prepared to engage in serious negotiations with interested parties to find an acceptable solution to the current situation.

Thank You Mr. Chairman.