



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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STATEMENT

BY

**AMBASSADOR MUNIR AKRAM
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

AT

**THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

ON

**THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
REGARDING COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGY**

New York,
11 May 2006.

**Statement by the Permanent Representative at the
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
On the REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
regarding
COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY
11 MAY 2006**

Mr. Co-Chairman,

The September 2005 Summit condemned acts of terrorism committed wherever and by whomsoever. The Summit decided that elements of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy suggested by the Secretary-General would be endorsed by the General Assembly.

2. Although the General Assembly did not solicit a Report from the Secretary-General, we thank him for submitting this.

3. In the process of the Secretariat's preparation of this Report, Pakistan submitted a paper outlining its views and comments on the elements of a Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy. I am circulating a copy of Pakistan's paper along with this statement.

4. The Secretary-General's Report focuses on the operational aspects of counter-terrorism and contains some important and some controversial proposals, on which we shall offer our comments. The report is focused, however, too heavily on actions to be taken by and within the UN system - it appears to be a strategy for the UN rather than Member States. The Report does not deal with the really important and difficult issues i.e. a clear definition of terrorism; the phenomenon of State Terrorism; and measures to address the underlying or root causes of Terrorism. Unless these are addressed, our Counter-Terrorism strategy will not be comprehensive; nor will the international community succeed in eliminating terrorism.

5. As the distinguished Ambassador of Colombia has informed the meeting, this Report was discussed extensively at a meeting of the Group of Friends of UN Reform in Cartagena on 5 and 6 May. The agreed conclusions of the Group have been circulated and, I believe, these will constitute an important contribution to this process of consultations designed to elaborate a comprehensive strategy.

6. As the Fox Group has stated the Secretary-General's Report is to be welcomed "as a contribution to the discussion" of a global Counter-Terrorism strategy. While condemning terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and

12. The argument that the above-mentioned acts of violence by a State's military are outlawed by international law and, therefore, need not be covered by the definition of terrorism, is special pleading and spurious. Secondly, a State's military should be subject to at least the same if not higher standards of accountability as are applied to non-State groups that resort to terrorism. Their exclusion would create a situation of legal and political impunity that would enable States to use their military power for repression and occupation of peoples whose legitimate resistance would, ironically, be de-legitimized as "terrorism".

13. There is a similar tendency, perhaps for the same reasons, to ignore the root causes of terrorism. To address the root causes is not to justify terrorism, but to understand it and thus to overcome it. We can kill or capture terrorists; disrupt their operations; destroy their organizations; but unless we prevent others from following their path, we cannot succeed in comprehensively combating terrorism. To win the war against terrorism, we must win the hearts and minds of those who are susceptible to sympathize and support the tactics of terrorism.

14. The 2005 Summit, somewhat euphemistically, agreed to address the "conditions conducive to terrorism". The Secretary-General's Report retreats into further euphemism by seeking to address the "conditions that could be exploited" by terrorists. Among these "conditions", the Report refers to "violent conflicts, human rights violations, religious and ethnic discrimination, political exclusion and socio-economic marginalization." These categories broadly cover the "conditions" that give rise to terrorism. Yet, the Report shies away from clearly listing these "conditions" or root causes. Without such clarity, we shall not be able to succeed in addressing such root causes.

15. Thus, it is true that 'violent conflicts' witness terrorism, both state and non-state terrorism. The report, however, focuses mainly on internal conflicts. Terrorism also often accompanies inter-state conflicts. But, more importantly, the report fails to mention the evident reality that terrorism occurs most often when a State's overwhelming military power is being utilized to occupy a weaker people or country or where it is being utilized to suppress the legitimate right of a peoples to self determination, liberty and freedom. Terrorism is most often utilized as a tactic of asymmetric warfare, by the weak and the desperate. Ending terrorism thus implies ending foreign military occupation and the violent suppression of self-determination and freedom of other peoples. It is vital, therefore, that any comprehensive strategy should address ways and means to resolve the current outstanding situations of foreign occupation and the denial of the legitimate right of peoples to self determination.

- i) In the short-term, the strategy could include operational actions such as cooperation in police, intelligence and forensic fields, financial controls and monitoring, border control, actions against organized crime and so on. The Secretary-General's report contains a number of proposals which can serve to improve such operational policy to counter-terrorism. We shall offer detailed comments on these proposals later.
- ii) In the medium term, the strategy should aim to improve further operational policies, including consideration of several proposals in the Secretary-General's Report. It could also seek to evolve the normative basis for counter-terrorism, including a definition of terrorism, the adoption of the counter-terrorism convention, measures to address - more practically - the WMD-Terrorism matrix and initiate politically vigorous processes to resolve the major conflicts and disputes that are currently fueling terrorism and extremism.
- iii) In the longer-term - perhaps a decade - the strategy could seek to succeed in addressing extremism, promoting a successful dialogue among civilizations and overcoming socio-economic stagnation and transformation in the developing and Islamic world.

20. Finally, the strategy should envisage a clearer institutional framework to ensure its implementation. Pakistan believes that the functions entrusted to the Security Council were a necessary but stop-gap arrangement to enable the international community to respond urgently to the terrorist threat. However, we need to adopt institutional arrangements that are universally accepted, governed and supervised by the UN General Assembly, thus involving all Member States. In this context, Pakistan continues to support the concept of creating an International Counter-Terrorism Centre as proposed by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.

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