"Trump Administration statements indicate that the Administration does not believe that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addresses the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration is considering ending or altering U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive...
This report bases its analysis primarily on the text of key documents involved in the issue – the JCPOA itself,2 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015,3 which endorsed the JCPOA, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17, of May 22, 2015)...
The Administration might seek to use the provisions of the JCPOA itself to cease U.S. implementation of its commitments under the agreement. Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA outlines a complex 'Dispute Resolution Mechanism' under which any party to the agreement can assert that another party is violating the accord and seek to resolve the issue. The Trump Administration could conceivably use this mechanism to accuse Iran of violating the letter - or spirit - of the JCPOA. The JCPOA mechanism outlines a process by which Iran can resolve such a dispute but provides that, 'if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA....' The dispute resolution mechanism also provides for the United States to be able to 'snap back' all U.N. sanctions that were in place prior to Implementation Day of the JCPOA (January 16, 2016). The United States is a veto-wielding permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and the dispute resolution mechanism enables any veto-wielding member to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions...
The INARA law that provides for congressional oversight of the JCPOA gives the Administration a number of options to cease or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA.
INARA authorizes the President to provide Congress with 'credible and accurate information relating to a potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran...' and, within 30 days of submitting such information, to determine whether the Iranian breach 'constitutes a material breach' and whether Iran has 'cured such material breach.' Under INARA, an Administration confirmation of an uncured material breach of the JCPOA by Iran would trigger expedited procedures for congressional consideration of legislation that would reimpose those U.S. sanctions that have been waived to implement the JCPOA – and prevent further such waivers...
Should the Administration seek to alter or end U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, it could decide to withhold certification of Iranian compliance on any of the grounds stipulated by INARA. For example, the Administration could withhold a compliance certification by arguing that Iran has not complied with the spirit of the agreement and that continuing to waive U.S. sanctions is therefore not vital to the national security interests of the United States. Congress might still act additionally on legislation to reimpose U.S. sanctions under the expedited procedures prescribed in INARA...
Alternatively, even if the Administration withholds certification of Iranian compliance, the Administration might decide to try to keep the accord in force by renewing the waivers of U.S. sanctions laws and otherwise declining to reimpose any sanctions. INARA does not require the Administration to reimpose U.S. sanctions if there is no certification of compliance, but it does, as noted above, give Congress the opportunity to enact legislation to do so, and under expedited procedures. The use of this option would signal Administration dissatisfaction with the JCPOA and perhaps suggest the Administration wants it renegotiated, but without necessarily causing the JCPOA to collapse..."